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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States, city residents are coming to the
uncomfortable realization that they have no right to local democracy. In
just the past few years, state legislatures have blocked local governments
from enacting all kinds of legislation, including ordinances dealing with
smoking, hydraulic fracturing, the minimum wage, gun control, nutrition,
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civil rights, immigration, plastic bags, and more.1 The sheer volume of
local enactments being “preempted” by state legislation has reached nearly
epidemic proportions. One watchdog organization reported that 2015 was
the most popular year for preemption in American history, with twentynine states considering comprehensive bills to preempt all manner of local
legislation.2
Though it is hardly unprecedented for states to preempt local
regulations, the breadth and ambition of the recent preemption efforts have
rarely been seen in American history. These efforts are the result of a
profound political realignment within many states that is reverberating
throughout our democratic system, and undermining many assumptions
about the nature of our democracy. This Article uses the lens of
preemption to examine the broader political trends it exemplifies and gauge
the capacity of our democratic institutions to withstand them. Part I
explains that preemption has become more prevalent because cities are now
overwhelmingly Democratic while state legislatures, dominated by
representatives of rural areas, are overwhelmingly Republican. The
vertical relationship between cities and states is now an outlet for a partisan
conflict between rural and urban areas. Part II describes how the nearly
perfect alignment of geographic divisions with partisan affiliations has
elevated the stakes of political conflict between cities and states, and raised
important questions about the future of liberal democracy.
The
1. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATEANALYSIS (2017), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20
Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/463Q-45HW] (highlighting
several areas where states are active in preempting city authority); Shaila Dewan, States Are
Blocking Local Regulations, Often at Industry’s Behest, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/govern-yourselves-state-lawmakers-tell-cities-butnot-too-much.html [https://perma.cc/7BDU-AY75]; Brian Eason, State to Locals: You Can’t
Do That. Or That, INDYSTAR (Mar. 6, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.indystar.com/story/
news/politics/2016/03/06/state-locals-you-cant-do/80607546 (focusing on preemption in
Indiana but also touching on national trends) [https://perma.cc/7S5N-Q3YK]; Cora Lewis,
States Are Barring Cities from Raising the Minimum Wage, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 23,
2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/coralewis/states-are-banning-cities-from-raising
-the-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/PAG7-KBPS] (discussing preemption of minimum
wage laws); Harold Meyerson, Blue Cities, Red States, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0307-meyerson-city-state-divisions-20160307story.html [https://perma.cc/E8N6-4L5D] (describing how preemption battles are becoming
“routine”); Claire Cain Miller, Liberals Turn to Cities to Pass Laws and Spread Ideas, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-to-cities-topass-laws-and-spread-ideas.html [https://perma.cc/G55Y-K53L]. The “Preemption Watch”
website, hosted by Grassroots Change, is a good resource focusing on public health-related
preemption issues. See Preemption Watch, GRASSROOTS CHANGE, http://grassrootschange.
net/issues/preemption/ [https://perma.cc/3D9V-8DNR].
2. Allie Yee, Growing Southern Cities Are Increasingly Targets of State Pre-emption,
FACING SOUTH (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/04/growing-southerncities-are-increasingly-targets-o [https://perma.cc/Y8M5-R935].
BY-STATE
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“Madisonian” vision of a democratic society characterized by ever-shifting
coalitions has been threatened as heightened partisanship, geographic
segregation, and the cultural and economic impacts of globalization have
hardened the division between urban Democrats and rural Republicans into
a perhaps permanent zero-sum conflict. Preemption is one front in this
conflict, as rural Republicans seek to negate the cultural and economic
gains they see urban Democrats making at their expense.
Part III looks to federalism as a possible means of mediating the conflict
between urban and rural areas. Federalism has long been a tool for
accommodating the competing claims of different groups within the
framework of the nation-state. Though state constitutions lack the robust
federal structure of our national Constitution, conferring upon sub-state
groups few of the rights that the national Constitution grants states, most
states nevertheless provide some recognition for group rights through a de
facto sort of intrastate federalism. The widespread practice of electing
legislators from single-member geographic districts provides some
representation for groups at the state level, while municipal home rule
grants groups some autonomy at the local level. However, intrastate
federalism has always been weak because courts are wary of recognizing
the rights and interests of sub-state groups. As a result, courts have freely
allowed states to dilute the influence of political minorities through
gerrymandering, and to quash local autonomy by preempting local
legislation despite the supposed protections of home rule.3 The current rash
of preemption follows directly from the weakness of intrastate federalism.
Although I conclude that stronger intrastate federalism is necessary in an
age of deepening urban/rural conflict, I also doubt that we can count on the
judiciary to save us from this predicament. Ultimately, it is up to the
citizenry to decide how much it values local democracy.
As a case study of the preemption phenomenon and the broader political
context it embodies, this Article examines one recent preemption effort that
has drawn substantial media attention and become a matter of national
controversy—North Carolina’s “bathroom bill.” The North Carolina
legislature convened a special session of the state legislature specifically to
preempt an ordinance enacted by the city of Charlotte, scheduled to go into
effect within a few days, that would have provided certain antidiscrimination protections to gays, lesbians, and transgender individuals,
including the freedom to use the bathroom of one’s identified gender.4 The
legislature ultimately passed House Bill 2 (“HB2”), a sweeping piece of
legislation that not only preempted the Charlotte ordinance, but prohibited

3. See infra text accompanying notes 193-99.
4. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7,056 (Feb. 22, 2016).
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all North Carolina municipalities from enacting any law dealing with
wages and hours, employment discrimination, public accommodations, or
municipal contracts.5 Under pressure from business interests including the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the state recently repealed part of
HB2 but left in place the prohibition on local anti-discrimination
ordinances.6
The bathroom bill presents an interesting example of the political trends
examined here. North Carolina is a state poised between a largely agrarian
past and an increasingly urban future, and today is evenly balanced
between Republicans and Democrats.7 As its cities grow and its population
of left-leaning Democrats expands, however, rural Republicans have
tightened their grip on the state legislature and increasingly embarked on an
anti-urban legislative agenda.8 The bathroom bill is one illustration of the
conflict between an emerging urban Democratic alliance that sees diversity
as vital to a globally networked future, and an aging rural power structure
that is fighting tooth and nail to preserve traditional morality and prevent
the state’s seemingly inevitable urbanization. As such, North Carolina
highlights many of the points of political division that will likely dominate
the near future.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE PREEMPTION BATTLE
A.

Republican States and Democratic Cities

The driving cause behind the recent preemption trend is a striking
political phenomenon: cities across the nation are becoming more

5. See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3. See generally Michael Gordon et al., Understanding
HB2: North Carolina’s Newest Law Solidifies State’s Role in Defining Discrimination,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
news/politics-government/article68401147.html [https://perma.cc/L3EL-CWPG]; David A.
Graham, North Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/north-carolina-lgbt-discriminationtransgender-bathrooms/475125/ [https://perma.cc/RP2U-Q23B].
6. See Craig Jarvis et al., HB2 Off the Books as Gov. Roy Cooper Signs Compromise
Into Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article141716579.html
[https://perma.cc/9SKK-RM8Q].
7. See, e.g., ROB CHRISTENSEN, THE PARADOX OF TAR HEEL POLITICS: THE
PERSONALITIES, ELECTIONS, AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED MODERN NORTH CAROLINA 317
(2008); TOM EAMON, THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY: NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS
FROM KERR SCOTT TO PAT MCCRORY 325 (2014) (observing that, between 2000 and 2012,
North Carolina was about as evenly matched as possible between Republicans and
Democrats).
8. See generally Alan Ehrenhalt, Resisting Inevitable Urbanization, GOVERNING (Dec.
2015),
http://www.governing.com/columns/assessments/gov-urbanization-north-carolina.
html [https://perma.cc/K3B3-9KLP] (reporting on the state legislature’s “anti-Charlotte
vendetta” after 2012 election).
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Democratic, while state legislatures are becoming more Republican.9
Twenty-six of the nation’s thirty largest cities have Democratic mayors.10
Even in solidly Republican states like Texas, major cities such as Dallas,
Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, and Austin are all led by Democrats.11
While city voters have been an important Democratic constituency for the
past century, demographic trends have pushed cities to support the
Democratic Party more overwhelmingly than ever before. Immigrants and
young professionals in the finance and services industries have flocked to
cities in recent years, causing them to become more populous, younger,
ethnically diverse, and consequently, more liberal.12 Charlotte, for
example, has doubled its population in the last twenty-five years and is now
among the twenty most populous municipalities in the country.13 Young
professionals, who are drawn to the nation’s largest financial sector outside

9. The emerging political divide between cities and state legislatures is surely not the
sole cause of the current preemption trend. Another key factor has been a concerted effort
by conservative political organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC) and industry executives to push for uniform statewide legislation in many areas.
See generally Thomas B. Edsall, The Republican Party’s 50-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/campaign-stops/the-republi
can-partys-50-state-solution.html [https://perma.cc/2LQT-HJZZ]. However, ALEC’s role in
preemption is not clearly distinct from the political factors mentioned in the text. See infra
note 42. The rise of ALEC and other ideologically motivated political organizations (such
as the liberal-leaning State Innovation Exchange, formed in opposition to ALEC) are
themselves part of the same process of political and geographic polarization that has caused
city and state governments to assume such divergent political profiles. See BILL BISHOP, THE
BIG SORT 221-28 (2008) (discussing ALEC in context of increasing political polarization).
It is therefore not surprising that ALEC has also played a key role in trying to ensure that
Republicans are elected at the state level. See Edsall, supra note 9. For additional
commentary on how Republicans have achieved control of many state legislatures, see Gary
Gerstle, America’s Other Election, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 2016), https://www.dissent
magazine.org/article/americas-other-election [https://perma.cc/8GKY-NFH8].
10. See Meyerson, supra note 1.
11. See id.; see also Alan Greenblatt, Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’
War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/govstates-cities-preemption-laws.html [https://perma.cc/ZN3R-AQ4U].
12. See Louis Jacobson, Why Democratic Governors and Republican Mayors Have
Become Rare, GOVERNING (July 16, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/govpolitical-party-success-president-governor-congress-mayor.html
[https://perma.cc/SK8YZBPV] (noting that cities are becoming younger, more diverse, and more liberal); Campbell
Robertson & Richard Fausset, Southern Cities Split with States on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/us/southern-cities-move-past-stateson-liberal-social-issues.html [https://perma.cc/FP5V-XN2A] (noting that fast-growing cities
in the south, fueled by banking, insurance, health care, and technology, are becoming more
liberal).
13. See Stephen Wolf, Why North Carolina Is Turning Blue: A Look at the State’s
Political Geography, DAILY KOS (Sept. 10, 2015, 11:29 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2015/9/10/1414999/-Why-North-Carolina-is-turning-blue-A-look-at-the-state-spolitical-geography [https://perma.cc/8VWY-56W7].
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of New York, have bolstered its growth.14 In addition, the Hispanic
population of Charlotte has grown by almost fifteen percent since 2010 and
helped make Mecklenburg County a majority-minority county.15 Thus, the
city and county have transformed from a Republican stronghold to a
heavily Democratic region.16
A similar pattern is evident in North Carolina’s other major urban areas,
including Greensboro, Fayetteville, and the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill
Research Triangle, which are also experiencing rapid growth fueled by
immigrants and young professionals.17 Overall, the growing populations
and the changing demographics and political compositions of these cities
have remade North Carolina from a predominantly rural, largely white, and
conservative state to an urbanized, diverse state that is evenly divided
between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.18 While North
Carolina may be an extreme example, a similar pattern is occurring

14. See generally Owen Furuseth et al., Belonging in Charlotte: Multiscalar Differences
in Local Immigration Politics and Policies, 105 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 1, 1 (2015).
15. See id. at 2; Adam Bell, Mecklenburg’s Hispanic Growth Rate Still Booming, New
Census Records Show, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 25, 2015, 1:00 AM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article25453342.html [https://perma.cc/BKY7
-UDVU] (noting that Charlotte experienced 14.8% growth in Hispanic population since
2010, and in 2012 Mecklenburg county became majority-minority).
16. See generally CHARLOTTE, NC: THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A NEW SOUTH CITY
(William Graves & Heather A. Smith eds., 2010).
17. See Charles Prysby, North Carolina: No Longer Federal Red and State Blue?, in
SECOND VERSE, SAME AS THE FIRST: THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE SOUTH 171,
174-75 (Scott E. Buchanan & Branwell DuBose Kapeluck eds., 2014) (noting influx of
Hispanics and younger, more liberal migrants into Research Triangle area and state
generally); Betina Cutaia Wilkinson, North Carolina Latinos: An Emerging, Influential
Electorate in the South, in LATINOS AND THE 2012 ELECTION 149, 149 (Gabriel R. Sanchez
ed., 2015) (noting rapid growth of Hispanic population in Raleigh-Durham); Micah Cohen,
In North Carolina, Obama’s 2008 Victory Was Ahead of Schedule, N.Y. TIMES:
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 4, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/04/in-north-carolina-obamas-2008-victory-was-ahead-of-schedule/
[https://perma.cc/5N3P-NYD2] (noting that Hispanic population in the state grew almost
tenfold from 1990 to 2010, mostly in main urban centers, and North Carolina now has
eleventh largest Hispanic population of any state). See generally Suzanne Gamboa, From
Tobacco to Tortillas: Latinos Remake Durham, North Carolina, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014,
7:37 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hispanic-heritage-month/tobacco-tortillaslatinos-remake-durham-north-carolina-n203276 [https://perma.cc/68BS-P5ZB] (describing
the influx of Hispanic immigrants to Durham and how they are refashioning local culture).
18. See Christopher A. Cooper & H. Gibbs Knotts, The Bluest Red State in America:
Exploring North Carolina’s Political Past, Present, and Future, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING
STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER 111 (Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015);
Prysby, supra note 17, at 171-84. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 7; EAMON, supra
note 7.
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throughout the south, as cities are becoming younger and more diverse,
changing the political and demographic profiles of states in the process.19
Nevertheless, in North Carolina and many other states, Republicans
dominate at the state level. Republicans control both houses of the
legislature in thirty-two states, and have veto-proof majorities in seventeen,
including North Carolina. Democrats control both houses in only thirteen
states, and have veto-proof majorities in just five.20 Many factors have
contributed to Republican dominance at the state level, but two are of
particular importance. First, rural voters have overwhelmingly sided with
the Republicans. As recently as the 1990s, half of all rural residents were
represented by a Democratic congressperson.21 Today, that number is
under twenty-five percent.22 Unlike any previous era in American history,
there is now a nearly precise correlation between an area’s population
density (that is, how urban it is) and its political affiliation.23 Standing

19. See generally Prysby, supra note 17, at 171-84 (anthology of essays describing
shifting political demographics throughout the south); Ronald Brownstein, The States That
Will Pick the President: The Sunbelt, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-states-that-will-pick-the-president-the-sunbelt/431838/
[https://perma.cc/GP8R-FGGZ] (noting that white share of population in North Carolina and
other states is declining due to urban growth, causing a shift in political preferences); Jen
Kinney, Houston Attitudes Changing on Inequality, Urban Life, NEXT CITY (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/survey-houston-urban-change-immigration-inequality
[https://perma.cc/DP9F-HVMS] (reporting that Houston is becoming increasingly more
Democratic and liberal on issues such as immigrants, gay rights, and criminal justice);
Meyerson, supra note 1 (noting the same); Robertson & Fausset, supra note 12.
20. See Stephen Wolf, Republicans Now Dominate State Government, With 32
Legislatures and 33 Governors, DAILYKOS (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:09 AM), http://www.dailykos.
com/story/2016/11/14/1598918/-Republicans-now-dominate-state-government-with-32legislatures-and-33-governors
[https://perma.cc/HNQ5-VWE5];
Paul
Woolverton,
Republicans Retain Veto-Proof Control of N.C. Legislature, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Nov.
9, 2016, 2:16 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/b91337dc-a63b-11e6-94b0-df0d1417c782.
html [https://perma.cc/CRP9-NKP3].
21. Laura Meckler & Dante Chinni, City vs. Country: How Where We Live Deepens the
Nation’s Political Divide, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 7:45 AM), http://www.wsj.com/artic
les/SB10001424052702303636404579395532755485004 [https://perma.cc/9AEQ-556E].
22. Id.
23. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 204-05; Paul Diller, The Urban Disadvantage in
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 292-97 (2016); Richard Florida,
America’s Class-Divided Electorate, CITYLAB (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/poli
tics/2016/10/trump-clinton-and-the-creative-class/504827
[https://perma.cc/THK2-6TS8]
(noting correlation between density and party affiliation). The urban/rural political divide
appears to elide the important question of suburban voters, who are neither clearly urban nor
clearly rural, but are perhaps the largest single bloc of the electorate in many states. See
infra text accompanying notes 77-85. However, the suburbs too have been drawn into the
urban/rural political conflict, with more urban inner suburbs siding with Democrats and
more rural outer suburbs and exurbs tending to vote Republican. See BRIAN MANN,
WELCOME TO THE HOMELAND: A JOURNEY TO THE RURAL HEART OF AMERICA’S
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION 66, 86-88 (2006). As the text states, there is a nearly precise
correlation between an area’s degree of urbanness and its predominant political affiliation.
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alone, the polarization of urban and rural voters would not explain
Republican dominance at the state level because, in many Republican
states, urban voters probably outnumber, or at least match, the number of
rural voters.24 However, rural voters tend to vote at a substantially higher
rate than urban voters, especially in midterm elections.25
The second major factor contributing to Republican dominance at the
state level is the population distribution of voters. While Democratic
voters are concentrated in a handful of urban legislative districts,
Republicans are more diffused among numerous, less dense districts.26
This disparity is the combined effect of Republican legislatures
intentionally gerrymandering legislative districts to maximize the number
of Republican seats and the natural population distribution of the two
parties’ voters. Republicans came to power in many states in 2010, just in
time for a new round of mandatory re-drawing of legislative district lines
after the 2010 census.27 Although states are required to create legislative
districts that have equal numbers of people, Democratic voters tend to
cluster at exceptionally high rates in small urban areas, whereas
Republicans are more spread out in rural areas.28 This pattern makes it
fairly easy for Republican legislatures to gerrymander districts to favor
Republicans by packing huge numbers of Democratic voters into a few
urban districts and distributing Republican voters somewhat more thinly
among numerous districts.29

24. See MANN, supra note 23, at 67.
25. See id.
26. See Diller, supra note 23, at 291 (“Republicans win more seats by 55-40%, while
Democrats win more by 75-20%.”).
27. See EAMON, supra note 7, at 328 (discussing Republican gerrymandering in North
Carolina after 2010 election); Diller, supra note 23, at 326 (“Following the censuses of 2000
and 2010, many Republican-controlled state legislatures engaged in intense gerrymandering
of state legislative and House seats.”).
28. This pattern has been referred to as “unintentional gerrymandering.” See Jowei Chen
& Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral
Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 239 (2013); see also Alec MacGillis, Go Midwest,
Young Hipster, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/
campaign-stops/go-midwest-young-hipster.html [https://perma.cc/CRN3-KUHZ]. There is
some disagreement about the causal role of intentional versus unintentional gerrymandering
in accounting for Republican legislative gains. Compare MacGillis, supra (attributing gains
to unintentional gerrymandering), with Stephen Wolf, Gerrymandering Could Cost
Democrats the House in 2016. Why? Because It Probably Did in 2012, DAILY KOS (Oct. 18,
2016, 3:17 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/10/18/1583215/-Gerrymanderingcould-cost-Democrats-the-House-in-2016-Why-Because-it-probably-did-in-2012
[https://perma.cc/M9AJ-CQ3R] (denying claims of “unintentional gerrymandering” and
asserting that intentional gerrymandering alone cost Democrats twenty-five seats in the
House of Representatives in 2012).
29. See, e.g., Chen & Rodden, supra note 28, at 264.
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As an illustration, Republicans in North Carolina gained a supermajority
in both houses of the state legislature during the 2012 presidential election
despite the fact that Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won
the state by only two percent over Barack Obama, the Democratic
incumbent.30 The discrepancy occurred in large part because Obama had
overwhelming support in North Carolina’s urban areas, but much less
support outside of them.31 The concentration of Democratic voters in
urban areas, and the dispersion of Republican voters in rural areas allowed
Republican legislators to cram those Democrats into a small number of
legislative districts, while spreading Republicans out into a far greater
number of districts. As a crude indicator, Obama won four state senate
districts by over eighty percent, all in the urban centers of Charlotte,
Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro, and another five by over sixty-five
percent.32 Romney, on the other hand, won no districts with over eighty
percent, and only four with more than sixty-five.33 In short, a huge
percentage of the urban Democratic vote is being “wasted” in legislative
districts where those votes are irrelevant to the outcome, and many fewer
Republican votes are similarly wasted.34 The result is that, although the
state’s urban voters are nearing, and may have actually surpassed, half the

30. See Stephen Wolf, A Comprehensive Look at the NC State Legislature Elections and
the 2014 Landscape Part 1: The Senate, DAILY KOS (July 22, 2013, 3:55 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/7/22/1223992/-A-Comprehensive-Look-at-the-NCState-Legislature-Elections-and-the-2014-Landscape-Part-1-The-Senate
[https://perma.cc/2G4C-STWJ].
31. See EAMON, supra note 7, at 295, 317 (noting rural/urban disparity in support for
Obama in both 2008 and 2012 elections). Although increasingly rare in today’s era of
polarized partisan politics, some of the discrepancy is also attributable to “ticket splitting”
by voters who selected a Democratic presidential candidate and Republican state legislators.
See id. at 318. As Charles Prysby notes, North Carolina voters were clearly unhappy with
the Democrats who had controlled the state government for many years prior to 2010. See
Prysby, supra note 17, at 184.
32. This is a crude indicator because, among other things, voters may split their tickets
and vote for a presidential candidate from one party and a legislator from a different party,
although this is becoming increasingly rare in an era of partisan polarization. See Wolf, A
Comprehensive Look at the NC State Legislature Elections and the 2014 Landscape Part 1:
The Senate, supra note 30.
33. See id.
34. See Diller, supra note 23, at 336-42. Legislative districts in North Carolina are so
precisely drawn to provide secure partisan advantage that a whopping fifty-three legislators
ran unopposed in North Carolina’s 2016 elections. See Colin Campbell, 53 NC Legislators
Lack Opponents as Filing Deadline Ends, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 21, 2015, 3:31 PM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article50935595.html [https://perma.cc/TA7S-4EW8]; see also Alan Greenblatt,
Uncontested Legislative Races Are Becoming More Common, GOVERNING (June 2016),
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-uncontested-legislative-races.html
[https://perma.cc/4H3G-X3G4] (noting the large number of uncontested races in many
states).
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actual electorate, North Carolina’s legislature is dominated by rural rather
than urban legislators.35
North Carolina is an exemplar of an emerging national pattern.
Nationwide, support for Democratic Presidential candidates has been
overwhelmingly concentrated in the most urban areas since 2008.36 In
2012, President Obama won only twenty-two percent of the nation’s
counties, fewer than even Democratic presidential candidate Michael
Dukakis won in the course of a landslide loss to George H.W. Bush in
1988.37 Obama won re-election by a healthy margin anyway because he
garnered an enormous sixty-nine percent of the votes in cities with more
than 500,000 people.38 Hillary Clinton improved even on that margin in
2016, winning seventy-one percent of the vote in the largest counties.39
The problem for the Obama/Clinton coalition is that, while urban areas
help Democrats attain votes, elections are determined by territory as well as
votes, and Republicans control far more territory.40 Clinton lost the
election despite winning the popular vote because she ran up huge leads in
urban states and lost by slim margins in less urban states. At the legislative
level, the concentration of Democratic voters in urban areas has had a
similar result–Democrats get more votes, but Republicans win the
elections. For example, although Obama won Virginia, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in 2012, Republicans took a two-thirds
advantage in congressional districts in those states because so much of

35. See generally Chris Kardish, How North Carolina Turned So Red So Fast,
GOVERNING (July 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-north-carolinasouthern-progressivism.html [https://perma.cc/3CBL-77A7] (explaining causes for
Republican domination in North Carolina after 2010); Wolf, Why North Carolina Is Turning
Blue: A Look at the State’s Political Geography, supra note 13.
36. Ronald Brownstein, Town and Country, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/town-and-country/432195
[https://perma.cc/4EL27UZ9] (noting that Democratic coalition under Obama is overwhelmingly urban).
37. David Wasserman, The GOP’s House Majority Is Safe . . . Right?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-gopshouse-majority-is-safe-right [https://perma.cc/WS2C-DM3J] (noting that Dukakis won
twenty-six percent of counties, compared to Obama’s twenty-two percent).
38. See Greenblatt, supra note 11.
39. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural American Are Becoming Increasingly
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing/ [https://perma.cc/9SK9-E7PT].
40. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012, (2013), http://www.
fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW8D-62CP], and FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008, (2009), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B7C-3TSP], with FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 96 (1997), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/cover.htm
[https://perma.cc/8BVA-GWWJ], and FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 93
(1993), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1992/federalelections92.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AFJTTXE].
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Obama’s support was concentrated in urban areas that were packed into a
handful of congressional districts.41 State legislative districts in these and
other states were similarly gerrymandered to favor Republicans because
Democrats were so heavily clustered in urban areas.
Republican
domination at the state level is, therefore, largely a consequence of the fact
that Democrats are overwhelmingly popular in the cities but extremely
unpopular outside of them.42
B.

Preemption and the Urban/Rural Rivalry

A consequence of this political phenomenon is the intensification of a
long-running urban/rural political rivalry. Historically, urban and rural
voters have held divergent political preferences.43 Urbanites generally
have a greater tolerance than rural dwellers do for government regulation
because aggressive state intervention is often required to coordinate activity
among large groups of strangers in a densely populated area. As Edward
Glaeser explains in Triumph of the City, although aggregating millions of
people into a small land area dramatically increases public health risks and
the potential for crime, city leaders can make cities safe through massive
public investments in clean water supplies and professional police forces.44
According to Glaeser, the need for a “vigorous public sector to combat
crime and illness” may explain “why people in New York are so much
fonder of big government than rural Kansas.”45 People in rural areas tend
to value individualism and to be more skeptical of government regulation,
which they often see as reflecting corrupt urban values and benefitting
urban areas at their expense.46
41. See Jonathan Chait, Who Needs to Win to Win?, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 3, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/republican-party-2013-2/
[https://perma.cc/C6KJ-6S5E];
see also Jacobson, supra note 12 (noting that clustering and post-2010 gerrymandering
created Republican advantage in the House); Wasserman, supra note 37 (noting that the
House of Representatives has a built-in Republican advantage due to the clustering of urban
voters and the huge number of wasted votes in urban areas).
42. There are other factors besides geographic clustering and gerrymandering that help
explain the Republican dominance at the state level. The electorate during midterm
elections, when many state gubernatorial and state legislative races take place, skews older,
whiter, and more Republican than the electorate during presidential election years. See
Jacobson, supra note 12. Moreover, conservative political organizations like ALEC have
undertaken a far more concerted effort to win control at the state level than liberal
organizations. See generally Edsall, supra note 9.
43. See Diller, supra note 23, at 290, 295-97.
44. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 93-116 (2011).
45. Id. at 116.
46. See Peter L. Francia & Jody Baumgartner, Victim or Victor of the ‘Culture War?’
How Cultural Issues Affect Support for George W. Bush in Rural America, 26 AM. REV.
POLITICS 349, 355-62 (2005) (describing connection between rural voters’ religious and
cultural views and their political affiliations); James G. Gimpel & Kimberly A. Karnes, The
Rural Side of the Urban-Rural Gap, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 467, 468-70 (2006) (describing
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In addition, cities have usually been quicker than rural areas to embrace
racial, religious, ethnic, and lifestyle diversity, because the anonymity and
impersonality of city life provides a freer environment for the expression of
various tastes and interests than the stricter moral order of smaller
communities. Similarly, constant exposure to immigrants and strangers of
all backgrounds breeds acceptance of new cultures and new ideas.47 Rural
areas, by contrast, are less densely populated and more ethnically
homogenous, and, unlike cities, have been experiencing a sustained period
of population loss rather than population growth.48 As a result, rural
residents have tended to adapt more slowly to cultural change and
diversity, and indeed often pride themselves on being the guardians of
traditional religion and morality against what they see as a morally
corrosive urban culture.49
Today, with Democrats controlling most cities and rural Republicans
controlling most states, the traditional rivalry between urban and rural areas
in American politics is now expressed vertically in the relationship between
the state and its cities. That is evident in the preemption battles. Unable to
get much traction for their policy preferences at the state level, urban
Democrats are enacting them at the far friendlier city level. Consistent with
their embrace of diversity and comfort with government regulation, cities
have recently adopted a flurry of laws dealing with health and safety,
workplace relationships, civil rights, climate change, immigration, and
others.50 But because state legislators are simultaneously becoming more

rural values of rugged individualism and skepticism of government). See generally
KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT (2016) (describing “rural
consciousness” in Wisconsin that drives political participation, characterized by resentment
of perceived urban values, antipathy towards government, etc.).
47. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 44, at 129 (noting that anonymity and impersonality
of large cities facilitates the loosening of moral constraints); Robert E. Park, Human
Migration and the Marginal Man, 33 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 881, 888 (1928) (In cosmopolitan
cities, the individual “is not bound as others are by the local properties and conventions.”).
48. See Meckler & Chinni, supra note 21 (describing how loss of manufacturing jobs in
rural areas has led to population exodus and insulation from cultural change).
49. See generally CRAMER, supra note 46, at 130-31, 222 (rural voters see themselves as
having values that are distinct from, and superior to, those of urban voters); MANN, supra
note 23, at 166-89 (describing how rural dwellers see themselves as champions of an
embattled traditional moral and religious culture that is threatened by the encroachment of
urban values). The past year or so has seen an explosion of interest in rural America and the
“white working class.” Two notable recent books include NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH
(2016), a historical discussion of the white lower class, and J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY
(2016), an affecting memoir about life in a rural white working-class family. For a review
and political context, see Alec MacGillis & Propublica, The Original Underclass, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/
492731/ [https://perma.cc/3C5R-RZV2].
50. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016
BYU L. REV. 177, 179-86, 252-53 (2016); Diller, supra note 23, at 290, 295-97.
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rural, conservative, and Republican, those local ordinances are increasingly
answered with preemption.51
The current political environment is, in a sense, reminiscent of a
previous era in American history. One hundred years ago, cities grew
enormously thanks to an influx of capital and immigrant labor, but state
legislatures were dominated by rural interests, largely as a result of
legislative districts that were malapportioned to over-represent rural
areas.52 Then, as now, these rural-controlled state legislatures were
displeased by the growth of cities and the threat they appeared to pose to a
traditional rural culture. State legislatures snatched power away from cities
through so-called “ripper” bills53 and attempted to disenfranchise urban
voters by adopting stringent voting rules such as onerous registration
requirements, the secret ballot, literacy tests, poll taxes, and the exclusion
of paupers from the franchise.54
At the same time, however, state legislative attitudes toward cities
during the early twentieth century were not uniformly hostile. State
legislatures also enacted laws designed to facilitate urban enterprise and
growth, and the period was marked, as David Barron has noted, by “state
legislative expansion of the spending, taxing, and regulatory powers of
local governments,” not solely the restriction of local government power.55
As Barron further explains, urban reformers in many states pushed for
Constitutional amendments granting local governments “home rule,” which
created a sphere of independent legislative activity for municipalities.
Home rule was designed to prevent state legislatures from either curtailing
51. Since gaining a supermajority of the North Carolina legislature in 2012, Republicans
preempted dozens of local laws and even changed voting rules in several urban areas to
make it harder for Democrats to win. See generally Ehrenhalt, supra note 8. A particularly
startling example of how preemption epitomizes the rural/urban political divide is gun
control. Urban dwellers overwhelmingly support gun control measures, but local gun
control ordinances are swiftly preempted by state legislatures because rural dwellers
vigorously oppose all gun control measures. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123
YALE L.J. 82, 98-103 (2013).
52. See DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 126 (3rd ed. 2002) (explaining that state governments were not responsive to
urban needs because “districts were drawn up to ensure that rural counties would outvote
cities in the state legislative chambers,” regardless of population).
53. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local SelfDetermination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 805 (1992); Lyle Kossis, Examining the Conflict
Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1125-128
(2012).
54. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 37-53 (2000) (explaining that many voting rights
innovations adopted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were efforts to
prevent urban residents, and specifically immigrants, from voting).
55. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2286 (2003).

146

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

local government power through ripper bills or expanding local power.56
That home rule simultaneously empowered and constrained local
governments reflected the ambiguous attitude state governments then
possessed toward cities.
The ambiguity had several sources. State legislatures understood that
cities were the economic engines of their states’ prosperity, and that state
legislative power could be expanded by acting through local
governments.57 Furthermore, state governments’ hostility toward cities
was mitigated by the fact that both major political parties had rural and
urban constituencies. This was especially true of the Democratic Party.58
For over a century, from the end of the Civil War until the 1980s, the
Democratic Party was an uneasy alliance of urban working-class voters in
the north and rural populists and anti-desegregationists in the west and the
“solid south.”59 Though bitterly antagonistic, these urban and rural voters
were forced into a coalition initially by their shared interest in opposing the
pro-business stance of the Republican Party, and then subsequently by the
largesse each enjoyed under the New Deal.60 The coalition began falling
apart during the 1960s, as the Democratic Party focused its efforts on urban
voters, while Republicans sought to peel away rural voters disaffected by
racial and cultural change.61
Today, many of the factors that caused state legislators to mitigate their
hostility to cities have vanished. After a long period of partisan
realignment, rural residents are now solidly aligned with Republicans and
urban dwellers with Democrats.62 According to one observer, “never
before in American history” have states and local governments “had such
distinct political profiles.”63 Furthermore, as I explain in greater detail
below, cities and rural areas are no longer as linked economically as they
were a century ago, so state legislatures have little reason to worry that
curtailing city power will have deleterious effects on the state’s rural areas
or its overall economic health. The dramatic scope of the current
preemption epidemic is evidence of just how unusual the current political
environment is.

56. See id. at 2291-2321.
57. See id. at 2286.
58. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 52, at 110-14.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.; MANN, supra note 23, at 238-59 (arguing that Democrats made a conscious
decision to abandon their rural base and focus on an urban agenda).
62. See Diller, supra note 23, at 292-97.
63. See Meyerson, supra note 1.
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II. HOW THE DEEPENING RURAL/URBAN CONFLICT THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY
A.

Madisonian Democracy

The preemption controversy, and the larger urban/rural fissure it
exemplifies, indicates that today’s partisan politics is an all-out conflict
between competing social groups, rather than a temporary alignment of
ephemeral interests.64 If that is true, it has dangerous implications for
liberal democracy. James Madison’s Federalist Number 10, often
considered a keystone of our democratic tradition, famously worried about
“factions” harming the paramount rights of individuals.65
While
recognizing the impossibility of eradicating these factions, Madison argued
that introducing a wide diversity of interest groups into the political realm
would make factions inherently unstable. He wrote:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.66

As Madison saw it, in a large republic comprised of many diverse
interests, factions would become temporary, shifting coalitions, not
permanent cleavages among a fixed set of antagonists.67 Expounding on
Madison’s insight, the political scientist Robert Dahl argued that
government in a large, diverse polity such as our own is only possible if
there are multiple cross-cutting lines of political division—“if the same
persons are sometimes opponents and sometimes allies”68 and today’s
minority has an expectation of being tomorrow’s majority.69 This notion of

64. Several recent works confirm that political affiliations today are permanent social
groups. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS
307 (2016); BISHOP, supra note 9, at 255-67.
65. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1106,
1127 (1980) (discussing how Madison’s concern with factions reflects liberal suspicion of
groups intermediate between the state and the individual).
66. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
67. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 30 (1961) (“[B]ecause
majorities are likely to be unstable and transitory in a large and pluralistic society, they are
likely to be politically ineffective; and herein lies the basic protection against the
exploitation of minorities.”).
68. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 279 (4th ed. 1981).
69. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 161 (1989); see also Frank I.
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 173 (1977) (describing “[t]he
Madisonian or Dahlian vision of coalitions that form and re-form from issue to issue, of
legislators exchanging support here for support there in an ever-shifting alignment of
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shifting coalitions enables everyone to see the long-term benefits of
cooperation, and prevents politics and trade from devolving into zero-sum
contests between warring classes.70 Dahl warns that, on the other hand,
“[i]f all the cleavages occur along the same lines, if the same people hold
opposing positions in one dispute after another, then the severity of
conflicts is likely to increase. The person on the other side is not just an
opponent; he or she soon becomes an enemy.”71 Where that happens,
where “the conflict is over two completely incompatible ways of life—then
any political system is likely to break down.”72
Dahl argues that our liberal democracy has usually functioned
reasonably well because, with some exceptions, it has featured numerous
cross-cutting allegiances that prevent extreme political polarization.73 Our
modern two-party system, for example, has tended to give our political
system a remarkable degree of stability by ensuring that political
differences are channeled through the two major national parties.74 The
two-party system also, however, provides an important warning. The
original purpose of the two-party system was to short-circuit a potentially
permanent cleavage between the north and south over slavery; both parties
were to be national entities built on broad ideological platforms that would
transcend the corrosive sectional conflict then building.75 The system
worked reasonably well as long as the parties were truly national. But once
the parties became identified with specific territories and opposing stances
on slavery, the country was almost immediately ripped apart.76
B.

The Hardening of Partisan Affiliations

Ominously, the territorial division of partisan allegiances that once
proved so perilous for our democracy is happening again today, though the
sectional conflict is now between urban and rural areas within states, rather

interest groups, making plausible an expectation that over the long run everyone would
enjoy a net balance of political gains in excess of losses . . . .”).
70. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 252 (arguing that
democracy is more likely to emerge where people see politics and trade as non-zero sum,
which destabilizes group identities and creates confluence of interest among people).
71. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 67, at 279.
72. Id. at 277. See also BISHOP, supra note 9, at 232, 297 (discussing some of Dahl’s
research and its implications for today’s geographically polarized political culture).
73. See DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 67, at 284-307.
74. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2121 (1990).
75. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 50-73 (1983) (noting
that Martin Van Buren believed the modern system of national parties was “the means of
keeping the slavery issue quiet”).
76. See id.
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than between northern and southern states. The urban/rural divide now
precisely corresponds to partisan affiliation.77 It appears, further, that our
urban and rural antagonists are not simply shifting coalitions but permanent
rivals in an increasingly zero-sum conflict. As Dahl worried, instead of
having multiple cleavages among multiple lines, today the cleavages all run
along the single line of partisanship.78 In a recent book, Christopher Achen
and Larry Bartels argue that parties are all-encompassing social groups
comprised of people who share similar values, not merely collections of
individuals with shared interests or views.79 Bill Bishop similarly argues
that today’s partisan divisions represent competing lifestyles with entirely
distinct—and mutually opposed—cultures, beliefs, interests, politics, and
geography. Bishop notes that this partisan identification has become so
strong that people do not even want to live near those with different
political affiliations, resulting in what he calls a “big sort” in which
Democrats and Republicans have self-segregated into communities of the
like-minded.80
In the past, when both parties had rural and urban voters, partisanship
eased the tension between them by uniting them against a common
enemy—the other party. Today, however, partisanship exacerbates that
tension by pitting rural and urban voters against each other. Psychological
research has persuasively demonstrated that the mere act of dividing people
into two groups creates an “us-versus-them” mentality.81 Moreover, the
increasing partisan divide between urban and rural dwellers in turn causes
partisans to take a zero-sum attitude towards politics. As Katherine Cramer
notes, identification with a social group causes people to seek more
resources for their own group, and where, as in politics, resources are
finite, this necessarily becomes a zero-sum game; groups quickly come to
resent other groups for taking more than their fair share of the resources.82
77. See Greenblatt, supra note 11 (“traditional regional rivalries almost perfectly align
with partisan divisions”); Seth C. McKee, Rural Voters and the Polarization of American
Presidential Elections, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 101, 101-06 (Jan 2008); Meckler & Chinni,
supra note 21 (chronicling the increasing urban/rural political divide).
78. See generally McKee, supra note 77, at 104-06.
79. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 64, at 307; see also BISHOP, supra note 9, at 255267; CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8.
80. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 8-9, 22-23, 199 (defining current sort as “postmaterialist” in that people are choosing where to settle based on lifestyle preferences, which
today closely correlate with political affiliations). Recent research confirms that the “big
sort” has continued and may have in fact gotten “bigger.” See Richard Florida, America’s
‘Big Sort’ Is Only Getting Bigger, CITYLAB (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/
politics/2016/10/the-big-sort-revisited/504830 [https://perma.cc/BEY7-KW63].
81. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 282-86; see also ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 64, at
220-21; CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8-9.
82. See generally CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8-12 (describing how partisanship
contributes to rural “resentment” towards urban dwellers).
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This dynamic of mutual resentment is evident in the preemption conflict.
One of the chief causes of the current preemption trend is the herding of
voters into gerrymandered legislative districts. As it turns out, this
dynamic is itself partially the result of the self-sorting Bishop describes –
people have sorted themselves into legislative districts in which one party
predominates.83 Bishop notes that although individuals do not consciously
move to particular legislative districts, they do migrate towards other
people who share their lifestyles, which today is overwhelmingly correlated
with partisan affiliation. The herding together of people with similar views
and their isolation from people with opposing views causes existing
partisan biases to harden and become more pronounced.84 As a result,
legislators in many districts now answer to an insular and ideologically
extreme constituency that desires nothing more intently than to notch a
victory against the competing political culture. Because Republican
legislators in states like North Carolina answer almost exclusively to rural
residents, preempting local legislation that reflects urban values is an easy
way to score points with rural voters without alienating any political
supporters. Likewise, Democratic city officials may enact legislation they
know will be preempted in order to demonstrate their commitment to
progressive causes.85
C.

The Zero-Sum Political Economy of Globalization

In addition to the urban/rural partisan realignment, globalization and the
aftermath of the Great Recession have also intensified the political divide
between urban and rural dwellers, and increased the sense that they are
competing in a zero-sum game in which one class will emerge victorious
and the other will be defeated. The rift over globalization, like today’s
hyper-partisanship, is also reflected in the preemption conflict.
As an initial matter, globalization has created a huge geographic
imbalance in economic fortunes as capital investment is increasingly
directed towards urban centers and away from rural areas. The global
economy is largely a service and knowledge based system that places less
emphasis on manufacturing capacity and a premium on innovation, which
is disproportionately occurring in places where creative people with diverse

83. See DAVID DALEY, RATF**CKED xxiv-xxv (2016) (arguing that today’s
gerrymandered districts have less to do with sorting and more to do with the increasingly
sophisticated technology legislators use to draw district lines).
84. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 73-75.
85. In states like California where the situation is reversed, Democratic legislatures can
enact a pro-urban, anti-rural agenda with little fear of reprisal. See generally Victor Davis
Hanson, How the Widening Urban-Rural Divide Threatens America, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1101-hanson-rural-urbandivide-20151101-story.html [https://perma.cc/D9PQ-Q94B].
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skills and knowledge are clustered together; that is, urban places.86 Firms
are located in cities where they can take advantage of the deep and diverse
labor pool.87 Cities across the world are increasingly connected to each
other through trade and the sharing of information.88 As jobs and capital
concentrate in urban centers, they spark demand for both skilled and
unskilled labor, so workers have flocked to cities as well, which explains
the population growth of cities such as Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham.89 A
large number of these workers are immigrants, whose diversity of skills
and knowledge boost cities’ economic prospects.90 Cities are being
transformed demographically in the process.91 The flow of capital and
labor into cities has been facilitated by liberal trade and immigration
policies that weaken national borders, a signature attribute of
globalization.92
As Richard Florida notes, though, if cities like Durham and Charlotte are
“winners” under globalization because free trade and liberal immigration
policies benefit them, rural and white working class suburban areas see
themselves as “losers” under globalization for the same reason.93 As the
86. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 144-55 (describing how dense, diverse cities foster
innovation); Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-will-reshapeamerica/307293/ [https://perma.cc/KB5N-KM56]; Richard Florida, The Winners and Losers
of Economic Clustering, CITYLAB (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/work/2016/
01/creativity-clustering-us-cities/422718/ [https://perma.cc/447R-GS42].
87. See Furuseth et al., supra note 14, at 2-4 (discussing Charlotte’s efforts to become a
“global city”).
88. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY (2008); SASSIA SASKEN, THE
GLOBAL CITY (1991).
89. See, e.g., Heather A. Smith & Warren Graves, Introduction. From Mill Town to
Financial Capital, in CHARLOTTE, NC: GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A NEW SOUTH CITY
(discussing Charlotte’s transformation into a globalizing city) supra note 16, at 1; Furuseth
et al., supra note 14, at 2-4.
90. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1077-79 (2007) (citing John M. Quigley, Urban
Diversity and Economic Growth, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 127, 130-32 (2008)); Tanvi Misra,
Immigration Is Absolutely an Urban Issue, CITYLAB (June 10, 2016), http://www.citylab.
com/politics/2016/06/immigration-is-absolutely-an-urban-issue/486386/
[https://perma.cc/ZZR2-PJ6M]; see also Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, in
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF CITIES 143, 150 (Richard Sennett ed., 1969) (“[The
city] has brought together people from the ends of the earth because they are different and
thus useful to one another, rather than because they are homogenous and like-minded.”).
91. See Misra, supra note 90.
92. See Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 150-51 (explaining how free trade policies such as
NAFTA created demand for low-skilled immigrant labor); Yishai Blank, The City and the
World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 868, 907-10 (2006) (noting that, as cities have become
significant sites of global economic activity, international economic institutions such as the
World Bank are advancing policies to decentralize power from nation-states to cities and to
push cities to adopt policies that encourage efficiency and innovation.).
93. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002).
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new global economy has linked cities together, it has also severed the
connection between cities and their surrounding rural areas, and those rural
areas have been left behind economically.94 The globalization of capital
and the loosening of trade barriers have caused manufacturing jobs to be
exported overseas while the globalization of labor and the liberal
immigration policies have led to fears that low-wage immigrant workers
will undercut wages for American citizens.95 Mechanization of agriculture
and other technological developments have also led to rural job loss.96
Being less dense and diverse than cities, rural areas cannot match the
advantages cities have in the new knowledge-based economy. This
disparity has been especially prevalent since the Great Recession. A recent
report demonstrates that half of the job growth since 2010 has been
concentrated in seventy-three counties comprising just a third of the
nation’s population.97 Not coincidentally, those seventy-three counties are
all among the country’s densest urban areas (including Mecklenberg and
Wake counties in North Carolina, which contain Charlotte and Raleigh,
respectively). Florida concludes that
America’s new economy is increasingly uneven not just across classes,
but across geography, with a few big winners and many more losers. This
is a product of the decline of manufacturing and the rise of an increasingly
concentrated knowledge economy, which is propelled by the clustering of
knowledge, talent, and innovation.98

The sense that the global economy is driving a wedge between urban
and rural areas, turning trade and immigration into zero-sum contests, is
hardening the political divide between urban and rural areas. The depth
of this divide is evident in the preemption conflict. To the extent they
see themselves winning from globalization, Democratic cities have
embraced political moves to encourage in-migration, free trade, and the

94. See Parag Khanna, A New Map for America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/a-new-map-for-america.html
[https://perma.cc/CUH3-F269] (“America is increasingly divided not between red states and
blue states, but between connected hubs and disconnected backwaters.”).
95. See Cohen, supra note 17 (describing decline of manufacturing and tobacco in North
Carolina and replacement by global banking, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and
telecommunications industries).
96. See Alana Semuels, The Graying of Rural America, CITYLAB (Jun. 2, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/06/the-graying-of-rural-america/485288/
[https://perma.cc/9MAQ-TFN8].
97. See Richard Florida, Geographic Inequality Is Swallowing the Recovery, CITYLAB
(May 23, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/05/there-are-more-losers-than-winne
rs-in-americas-economic-recovery-due-to-geographic-inequality/483989/
[https://perma.cc/56XL-WZFU]. Florida also notes increasing inequality in job growth
between the twenty largest counties nationwide and the rest of the country. Id.
98. Id.
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clustering of creative people.99 Several cities have adopted “living
wage” ordinances to entice lower-income workers, redeveloped
waterfronts and derelict industrial sites, and crafted special zoning laws
and tax incentives to lure artists and creative people.100 Mayors across
the country came out widely in favor of President Obama’s proposed
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which they saw as increasing
cities’ abilities to connect to each other and leverage the global economy
to their advantage.101 Many cities, including Charlotte, have attempted
to adopt “sanctuary city” type policies to signal friendliness to
immigrants (such as the adoption of municipal identification cards,
requesting or requiring police to refrain from questioning people about
their immigration status in certain types of stops, and the like).102
Charlotte’s decision to extend civil rights protections to gay and
transgender individuals, which ultimately led to North Carolina’s
“bathroom bill,” can also be viewed as an attempt to enhance the city’s
position in the global knowledge-based economy by attracting members
of what Florida calls “the creative class.”103 As Florida’s famous “gayBohemian” index demonstrates, there is a close correlation between
99. See, e.g., Furuseth et al., supra note 14, at 2-4.
100. See, e.g., Tyrel G. Moore & Gerald L. Ingalls, A Place for Old Mills in a New
Economy: Textile Mill Reuse in Charlotte, in CHARLOTTE, NC: GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A
NEW SOUTH CITY, supra note 16, at 119 (discussing adaptive reuse of old textile mills in
Charlotte as loft living spaces for financial services employees, and use of tax incentives to
encourage adaptation).
101. See Ronald Brownstein, Mayors Rise to the Defense of Free Trade, ATLANTIC (Mar.
24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/clinton-sanders-free-trade/
475113/ [https://perma.cc/M755-6TEQ]; Vicki Needham, Dem Mayors Line Up for Obama
Trade Deal, HILL (Jan. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/267091-demmayors-line-up-for-obama-trade-deal [https://perma.cc/HCD3-NEP4]. But see Jillian
Jorgensen, De Blasio Rips Trans Pacific Partnership, Calls NAFTA a ‘Disaster,’ OBSERVER
(Apr. 7, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://observer.com/2016/04/de-blasio-rips-trans-pacific-partner
ship-calls-nafta-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/8MAB-K25T]. See generally Binyamin
Appelbaum, Simmering for Decades, Anger About Trade Boils Over in ‘16 Election, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/business/economy/trade-don
ald-trump-bernie-sanders.html [https://perma.cc/C5KV-DY6C] (explaining the complex
politics of trade and the TPP); Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Supporters Pin
Hopes on Lame-Duck Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
02/business/trans-pacific-partnership-supporters-pin-hopes-on-lame-duck-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZHH-ZEL6].
102. See Steve Harrison, New Sanctuary City Law Could Force Charlotte to Change
Civil Rights Resolution, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 29, 2015, 6:14 PM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article41857026.html [https://perma.cc/6PZ58H6G]; see also Amber Tong, What Exactly Is a Sanctuary City?, GOVERNING (July 29,
2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-sanctuary-city-congressgeorgia-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/8C8N-JSUN] (describing some examples of
sanctuary cities).
103. See generally FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 93, at 283314.
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cities with concentrations of gays and artists, and higher incomes and
housing prices. Florida theorizes that this is so because communities
that are friendly towards bohemians and gays are more likely to be open
to talented people “across racial, ethnic and other lines,” that creative
people are more likely to be attracted to communities with inclusive
cultures, and that historically marginalized groups like artists and gays
are more likely to themselves be involved in the innovative and creative
work that the knowledge-based economy values.104 Indeed, in a recent
interview, Charlotte mayor Jennifer Roberts explained, citing Florida’s
work, that one motivation behind the city’s decision to extend civil rights
protections to gays and transgender individuals was the desire to boost
the city’s economy by bringing in more creative people.105
Republican state legislators, who answer almost exclusively to rural
residents, are motivated to enact policies that reflect their rural
constituents’ hostility towards globalization. Preempting local laws
designed to enhance cities’ position in a global economy is a natural
expression of this underlying hostility. North Carolina’s HB2, of course,
preempted Charlotte’s effort to provide civil rights protections for
transgender individuals as well as all other local civil rights and workplace
protection laws, and the state also preempted all local sanctuary city
policies after Charlotte announced its intention to adopt such policies.106
Many other states have similarly blocked local immigration, civil rights,
and workplace regulations (including living wage laws).107 In effect, if not
intent, these laws make it harder for cities to succeed in a global economy
that rewards diversity and a liberal approach to immigration. Charlotte has
already felt some of the adverse impacts of these preemption efforts, as, in
light of HB2, the electronic payment service PayPal recently cancelled
plans to build a facility in Charlotte, the National Basketball Association
moved the annual All-Star Game from the city, and several performers
cancelled concerts in the state.108 State legislators, though, have little

104. See FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY, supra note 88, at 135-39.
105. See Ronald Brownstein, ‘Just Let Charlotte Be Charlotte,’ ATLANTIC (Jun. 17,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/just-let-charlotte-be-charlotte/48
7499/ [https://perma.cc/3W9T-76ZV] (transcribing interview with Charlotte mayor Jennifer
Roberts); Ronald Brownstein, The Twin Challenges Facing Charlotte, ATLANTIC (Jun. 16,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/charlottes-web/487256/ [https://
perma.cc/S5DH-4DXB] (noting that Charlotte’s immigration and civil rights policies are
intended to create an inclusive environment that will attract young, well-educated
professionals and boost the city’s economy, citing Florida’s “creative class” theory).
106. See Harrison, supra note 102; Tong, supra note 102 (noting that North Carolina has
some of the strictest laws against sanctuary cities).
107. See Tong, supra note 102 (on immigration).
108. See Jennifer Bendery, HB2 Just Cost North Carolina Another $250 Million,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2016, 6:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pat-mcc
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disincentive to take actions that harm cities because, in today’s global
economy, cities are already so completely disconnected from rural areas
that an urban economic downturn is unlikely to have ripple effects on the
places Republicans care about. In fact, in a political environment divided
between apparent “winners” and “losers,” a city’s economic loss can easily
be presented as a win for declining rural areas.109
Republican attitudes with regard to trade are complex, but it is notable
that Donald Trump won the Presidency in part due to his hardline
opposition to free trade and immigration, despite renouncing Republican
orthodoxy on many other issues. Trump’s message resonated primarily in
economically declining, rural areas of the country, where most of his
support was concentrated.110 His campaign, epitomized by his “Make
America Great Again” slogan, was driven by supporters’ sense that they
were “losers” under globalization.111 A recent survey shows that
Republican attitudes toward trade have made a dramatic negative turn over
the last ten years—in 2006, forty-three percent of Republicans had positive
attitudes toward trade compared to twenty-seven percent with negative
attitudes; today, forty-seven percent view trade negatively and only
eighteen percent view it positively.112 Indeed, there is increasing
speculation that globalization may be sparking a partisan realignment, with
Democrats becoming the pro-globalization party and Republicans the anti-

rory-hb2-north-carolina_us_5811213ee4b0990edc2f0cad [https://perma.cc/76ZE-KBWC]
(describing these and other adverse impacts of HB2); Gordon et al., supra note 5; see also
NBA Moves North Carolina All-Star Game over ‘Bathroom Bill,’ BBC NEWS (July 22,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36863216 [https://perma.cc/NX4939FV].
109. Ironically, rural areas do benefit from urban prosperity insofar as urban tax dollars
are redistributed to rural areas. In fact, rural places receive far more in tax dollars than they
pay. However, as Kathryn Cramer’s important recent study reveals, rural dwellers believe
that they pay more than they receive from cities because they perceive themselves as hard
workers and urban dwellers as lazy. See CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8, 45-65, 130-31, 14549. This perception, of course, reflects differences in urban and rural cultural values,
discussed further in the next section.
110. See Edsall, supra note 9.
111. James Surowiecki, Losers!, NEW YORKER (June 6 & 13, 2016), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2016/06/06/losers-for-trump
[https://perma.cc/VS6F-4QMR]
(noting that Trump’s campaign was driven by a sense of loss among his supporters).
There has been a wealth of literature in the last few years on the rural white working
class and its politics. See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Trump: Tribune of Poor White People, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (July 22, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/
dreher/trump-us-politics-poor-whites/ [https://perma.cc/HHS5-HUVQ].
112. See Vicki Needham, Trump’s Negative Trade Views Influencing GOP, Polls Show,
HILL (Sept. 23, 2016, 3:21 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/297506-trumps-negativeviews-on-trade-influencing-republicans-poll-shows [https://perma.cc/MG5V-FYH4].
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globalization, nationalist party.113 This move would track similar trends
elsewhere in the world. Anti-immigrant and anti-trade nationalist political
parties are gaining strength across Europe, driven by fears that
globalization and immigration are weakening national identity.114
Concerns about immigration and global economic integration were also
behind the successful campaign for Britain to withdraw from the European
Union.115 It should come as no surprise that support for Britain leaving the
European Union, as well as for nationalist political parties elsewhere in
Europe, has been strongest in depopulating, declining rural and industrial
areas outside urban centers and weakest within growing cities.116
D.

The Cultural Costs of Globalization

The rising anxiety about immigration and global integration indicates
that globalization’s economic changes are increasingly entwined with
cultural changes, and these cultural changes have similarly increased the
social and political divide between urban and rural areas. By enabling and
incentivizing mobility, globalization has intensified the geographic selfsorting of populations by both socio-economic status and cultural attitudes
towards government and diversity. Intentionally or not, people are
gravitating toward communities in which most of their neighbors share

113. See Michael Lind, This Is What the Future of American Politics Looks Like,
POLITICO MAG. (May 22, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016election-realignment-partisan-political-party-policy-democrats-republicans-politics-213909
[https://perma.cc/9HAA-Q58C]; see also David Brooks, Where America Is Working, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/where-america-is-work
ing.html [https://perma.cc/RUK2-6XF7]; Needham, supra note 112 (finding a positive
change among Democrats in their attitudes of trade compared to ten years ago).
114. See Ronald Brownstein, Why Trump Looks Eerily Familiar to Germans, ATLANTIC
(May 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/atlantic-cross
ings/482448/ [https://perma.cc/T5XW-BA9R] (noting the popularity of right-wing
nationalist parties in Europe was driven by “fear that economic and cultural globalization,
along with demographic change, is erasing their nation’s unique identity”).
115. See id.; Annie Lowrey, How Donald Trump Explains ‘Brexit,’ N.Y. MAG. (June 21,
2016, 9:47 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/how-donald-trump-explainsbrexit.html [https://perma.cc/YW6J-RQZR] (noting connections between the Brexit
campaign and the rise of Trump).
116. See Daniel Davies, Brexit Supporters Say They’re Worried About Immigration. The
Real Problems Are Deeper, VOX (June 20, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/
20/11965064/brexit-immigration-economic-decline [https://perma.cc/6LMC-4MRA].
In
Austria’s recent presidential election, the far right nationalist candidate Norbert Hofer
narrowly lost to mainstream candidate Alexander van der Bellen. See Boris Groendahl &
Alexander Weber, Austrian Far Right Defeated in Cliffhanger Presidential Vote,
BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201605-23/austrian-far-right-defeated-in-cliffhanger-presidential-election
[https://perma.cc/T6W8-A55Q]. Hofer’s support was overwhelmingly concentrated in rural
areas, while Van der Bellen’s was almost entirely in the country’s urban regions, especially
the capital city of Vienna. See id.
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their own political and cultural perspectives.117 At the same time, because
cities are no longer economically linked with adjacent rural areas, city and
rural dwellers rarely have any reason for contact with one another, and no
longer see their fates as linked together in any significant way.118 The
evolution of distinct and mutually exclusive political cultures is magnified
by the rise of the internet and twenty-four hour cable news networks that
enable people with distinct cultural and political preferences to receive
their news and entertainment from entirely distinct sources that expressly
cater to those preferences.119
Moreover, the sorting process itself hardens the cultural boundaries
between rural and urban dwellers.
The population mobility that
globalization enables is almost entirely one way—from rural to urban
areas.120 Between 2010 and 2014, rural areas lost an average of 33,000
people per year, a period during which cities gained as many as 2.3 million
people per year.121 City dwellers have become accustomed to constant
change, disruptive innovation, and swelling diversity, which yields more
liberal and accommodating attitudes, while rural areas have become
insulated against cultural change and diversity, resulting in a more
conservative perspective.122 In the absence of any economic or cultural
interchange between the two regions, each sees the other as morally corrupt
or backward.123
As before, this cultural divide between urban and rural areas leads to an
increasingly zero-sum political contest. Since the 1960s, Democrats have
pursued a deliberate strategy to concentrate their resources on urban voters,
117. See generally BISHOP, supra note 9 (describing increasing “sorting” of population
into communities with nearly homogenous political preferences).
118. See id. at 72-77 (describing studies showing that, as communication between
members of the two parties diminishes, both sides “come to see each other as more extreme
or radical”).
119. See id. at 74-77; see also MANN, supra note 23, at 75-85 (describing how
segmenting of American media has enabled rural areas to create their own cultural universe
that is distinct from, and antithetical to, the urban culture).
120. See generally Semuels, supra note 96.
121. See id. (on rural population loss); Emily Badger, Metropolitan Areas Are Now
Fueling Virtually All of America’s Population Growth, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/03/27/metropolitan-areas-are-nowfueling-virtually-all-of-americas-population-growth/ [https://perma.cc/9ENF-LHDJ] (on
urban population growth).
122. See generally Rob Christensen, GOP Confronts Rural-Urban Divide, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/politics-columns-blogs/rob-christensen/article15113450.html
[https://perma.cc/73F8-7C6F] (describing how aging rural areas become more isolated from
cultural change as young skilled people leave).
123. See generally BISHOP, supra note 9 at 74-77; MANN, supra note 23, at 79-85
(“People in your world who think urban progressives aren’t just different, they’re bad or
evil.”).
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while Republicans have appealed to white voters disaffected by cultural
and racial change and disenchanted by liberal urban values.124 That trend
reached its apotheosis during the 2016 presidential election, as Donald
Trump ran a campaign that, despite his status as a lifelong New Yorker,
was anti-urban to its core.125 On the other hand, Democratic presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign paid more attention to issues of
concern to urban voters.126
The social and geographic distance between urban and rural areas has
caused cultural conflict to become increasingly uncompromising, with each
side seeing issues related to race, gay marriage, gun control, abortion, and
civil rights for transgender individuals as, once again, zero-sum contests in
which either urban or rural culture will decisively win out over the other.
One example is the debate over the “Black Lives Matter” movement, which
both sides of the 2016 presidential campaign exploited to mobilize
voters.127 Though the phrase and the larger movement grew out of several
controversial police killings of unarmed black men and were aimed at
establishing the seemingly uncontroversial proposition that black lives
should be accorded the same value as white lives, the phrase was attacked
as racist for the supposed implication that “only black lives matter.”128 The
leap from “Black Lives Matter” to the inference that “only black lives
matter” reflects a zero-sum racial logic—emphasizing the value of black
lives somehow devalues other lives. On the other hand, there have been
several troubling incidents on university campuses of left-leaning groups

124. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 52, at 110-14; MANN, supra note 23, at 238-59
(arguing that Democrats made a conscious decision to abandon their rural base and focus on
an urban agenda).
125. See David Dudley, The GOP Is Afraid of My City, CITYLAB (July 22, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/07/the-gop-is-afraid-of-baltimore-chicago-detroit-stlouis/492671 [https://perma.cc/PWG3-QDUQ] (arguing that Trump’s anti-urban platform is
aimed at scaring rural voters who are terrified of cities); Vann R. Newkirk II, Mayors vs.
Trump, CITYLAB (July 27, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/07/cities-mayorstrump/493211 [https://perma.cc/DQ9F-43V6] (observing that Trump’s message on crime,
immigration and other issues is essentially anti-urban); Josh Stephens, Trump to Cities:
You’re Dead to Me, PLANETIZEN (July 26, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.planetizen.
com/node/87620/trump-cities-you’re-dead-me [https://perma.cc/ANF8-NR57] (comparing
Trump’s “law and order” message to its Nixonian forerunner in the 1970s and noting the
anti-urban roots of the message).
126. See Erick Trickey, Hillary Clinton’s Urban Agenda, NEXT CITY (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://nextcity.org/features/view/hillary-clinton-urban-agenda
[https://perma.cc/BG6E4SZ2].
127. See Ronald Brownstein, Trump and the City, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-and-the-city/491249/
[https://perma.cc/FZ69-KBCC] (suggesting “Black Lives Matter” is an urban issue).
128. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins–
Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 711 (2015) (discussing the controversy over “Black Lives Matter”).
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attempting to prevent the airing of views that dissent from a supposed
moral consensus, on the grounds that these views are not only clearly
wrong, but are so offensive that mere exposure to them would inflict harm
on students.129 On both sides of the debate, there is the sense that any gains
one moral culture achieves must come at the expense of the alternative
moral culture. Because, in our age of geographic self-sorting and a
globally networked urban economy, people so rarely come into contact
with those who have different views or lifestyles, it becomes all too easy to
demonize the “other” and avoid any kind of compromise or debate.
E.

Fight over the Franchise

Perhaps the clearest evidence of how uncompromising the political
struggle between urban and rural areas has become is that both sides have
given up attempting to persuade the other and have instead devoted their
resources to achieving victory through demography. The last few years
have witnessed a flurry of new voting rules in Republican-controlled states,
usually enacted on a strict-party line vote, that make voting harder for
likely Democrats. The new rules limit early, absentee, and mail-in voting,
require voter registration prior to Election Day, purge voter rolls of
individuals who are suspected of being ineligible, and impose strict
requirements that certain forms of identification be provided as a
prerequisite to voting.130 Though styled as efforts to attack voter fraud,
these new rules appear intended to depress turnout by likely Democratic
voters, especially the poor and African Americans.131 North Carolina
adopted perhaps the strictest set of voter restrictions in the country,
eliminating same-day registration, reducing the early voting period,

129. See, e.g., Zachary Benjamin and Michael Qian, Campus Reacts to Blue Lives Matter
Display Replaced by #BlackLivesMatter Posters, DARTMOUTH (May 13, 2016, 7:14 AM),
http://www.thedartmouth.com/article/2016/05/display-removed-in-collis-replaced-withblacklivesmatter-posters [https://perma.cc/K56X-D42E] (describing one incident of student
silencing on moral grounds at Dartmouth College).
130. For a survey of some of the restrictions recently adopted in Republican-controlled
states, see Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane Scotus: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s
Discrimination Checkpoint in Shelby County and the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on
Voting Rights, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S11, S35-S49 (2016). As Haygood notes, the
recent wave of new voting rules began shortly after the Supreme Court’s controversial
decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Shelby County struck down a
part of the Voting Rights Act that required many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, to
seek “pre-clearance” from the United States Justice Department before making any
alterations to their voting rules. See id. Many of the new voting rules adopted after Shelby
County have been challenged in court under various provisions of federal law, and the
results so far have been mixed. See id.
131. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (2016)
(describing North Carolina Voter ID law as targeting African Americans “with almost
surgical precision”).
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enacting stringent identification requirements, and making the casting of
provisional ballots more difficult.132 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently struck down North Carolina’s law as an intentional effort to keep
black voters from the polls in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.133 Challenges to voter ID laws in other Republican states have had
mixed success in the courts.134
As Republicans have moved to shrink the pool of urban Democratic
voters, Democrats have responded by attempting to expand the pool. For
example, Democratic Governor Terry McAulliffe of Virginia recently
issued an executive order (thereby circumventing a vote in the Republicancontrolled legislature) enfranchising thousands of convicted felons, many
of whom are likely to be Democrats.135 The order could have huge
political implications in a state that, like neighboring North Carolina, is
closely divided between urban Democrats and rural Republicans.
Democrats have also sought to expand the Democratic voter base by
pushing statehood for the District of Columbia.136 The state would be
solidly Democratic and, as the only city-state in the union, increase the
strength of the urban alliance in Congress (for that very reason,
Republicans oppose the campaign).137 As this discussion makes clear, both

132. See Haygood, supra note 130 at S37.
133. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214.
134. Compare Veasey v. Perry, 29 F. Supp. 3d 896 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (invalidating voter
ID law because disproportional effects of law were related to past intentional discrimination,
but noting that disparate impact alone is not enough to invalidate voter ID law), with Frank
v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding Wisconsin voter ID law despite
disparate impact on Latinos and African Americans).
135. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm, Virginia Governor Restores Voting
Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/23/us/governor-terry-mcauliffe-virginia-voting-rights-convicted-felons.html
[https://perma.cc/3HUB-BWZA]. McAuliffe’s order was reversed by the Virginia Supreme
Court, which held he could not order a blanket clemency for all convicted felons, so
McAuliffe has stated his intent to sign individualized orders for the thousands of
disenfranchised Virginians. See David A. Graham, Terry McAuliffe’s Second Try at
Restoring Felon Voting Rights, ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/08/virginia-felon-disenfranchisement-mcauliffe/496898/
[https://perma.cc/3R5U-HKYT]. On the rural/urban politics of Virginia, see Ronald
Brownstein, Why Cities Love Tim Kaine, ATLANTIC (July 27, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2016/07/tim-kaine-metropolitan-model/493238
[https://perma.cc/6V35-PL2F].
136. See Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton: Restoring Faith in Democracy, WASH.
INFORMER (May 11, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://washingtoninformer.com/news/2016/may/11/
hillary-clinton-restoring-faith-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/2E7B-ZEDV] (referencing both
McAuliffe’s executive order and North Carolina’s restrictive voter identification law).
137. See Perry Stein, Kasich on D.C. Voting Rights: ‘That’s Just More Votes for the
Democratic Party.,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/local/wp/2016/04/21/kasich-on-d-c-voting-rights-thats-just-more-votes-in-thedemocratic-party/ [https://perma.cc/A4CZ-LKF2] (transcribing interview with then-
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parties have largely abandoned their appeal to the once-exalted “swing
voters,” and focused instead on mobilizing the voters who are already loyal
to their party.138
F.

Reasons for Optimism

In light of the foregoing observations, the assumption of liberal
democracy that group affiliations are temporary, fleeting coalitions looks to
be untenable. The rural/urban political divide appears to be a lasting one,
and there are few obvious ways to bridge that divide. There may, however,
be reason to hope that this will change in the future. Urban dwellers may
become more skeptical of government as they see that private individuals
can coordinate their conduct through sharing and crowd sourcing without
government oversight, as housing costs rise due to onerous land use
regulations, and as cities continue to struggle to manage their finances and
provide basic services.139
Minority communities displaced by
gentrification as the “creative class” bids up housing prices in cities may
ask whether they too have become losers under globalization.140
Meanwhile, as white rural communities struggle with a burgeoning heroin

Republican presidential candidate and Ohio Governor John Kasich, who stated one reason
for opposing D.C. statehood as “that’s just more votes in the Democratic Party”).
138. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 250-75 (observing that Republican President George
W. Bush defeated Democratic challenger John Kerry in 2004 in part because Bush
understood that voters were polarized politically and focused on mobilizing Republicans,
whereas Kerry focused on persuading shrinking number of swing voters).
139. See Edward L. Glaeser, The GOP and the City, CITY J. (Winter 2013),
http://www.city-journal.org/html/gop-and-city-13527.html [https://perma.cc/XR5Y-L2ES]
(arguing that cities could benefit from free-market thinking on school choice, transportation,
land use, provision of municipal services, and other areas). On the difficulties of regulating
the sharing economy, see Nestor Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016), and Kellen Zale, Sharing
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501 (2016). As an extreme example of the fallout from a
city’s financial mismanagement, in the fall of 2015 the city of Chicago adopted the largest
property tax increase in the city’s modern history, which all went to pay down the city’s
existing pension obligations. See Hal Dardick, 2016 Brings Tax Hikes for Chicago, Cook
County, City Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 31, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-new-taxes-fees-20151231-story.html
[https://perma.cc/GE4A-CY88].
140. See Gillian B. White, The Downside of Durham’s Rebirth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/03/the-downside-of-durhams-rebir
th/476277/ [https://perma.cc/TMB2-FSWP] (detailing Durham’s struggles with growth,
gentrification, rising housing costs and pricing out existing residents); see also Aaron M.
Renn, Trump’s Pitch to Blacks, CITY J. (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.city-journal.org/html/
trumps-pitch-blacks-14695.html [https://perma.cc/VE99-CA7Q] (arguing that urban blacks
have been harmed more than any other group by mass immigration).
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epidemic, they may join with urban dwellers to reject the harsh tactics of
the drug war.141
Likewise, the politics of globalization are not, or at least not yet, a neat
urban/rural division. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership was
supported by former President Obama, several big-city mayors, and many
Republican members of Congress, but opposed by other big-city mayors,
many Democratic members of Congress, and both the Democratic and
Republican presidential candidates in 2016.142 This unusual alignment
demonstrates that the costs and benefits of globalization do not break down
cleanly along urban/rural lines. If globalization has been a net harm for
rural areas, it has hardly been an unvarnished boon for urban areas.
Globalization has contributed to a widening economic inequality within as
well as between cities, and the threat of global climate change and
international terrorism is probably most acute in cities.143 Cities have
attempted to mitigate many of these impacts through affordable housing
legislation, minimum wage and other workplace rules, financial
regulations, and enactments aimed at climate change.144 Although, as we
have seen, many state preemption efforts today are motivated by a backlash
against globalization, the reality is that state legislatures are not immune to
the pressures of a transnational economy, despite their accountability to
rural residents who are wary of globalization. One signature characteristic
of globalization is the mobility of business firms, so states must be wary of
taking actions that might spark disinvestment. By preempting local
business regulations, state legislatures are deferring to global industry
leaders who demand uniform statewide commercial regulation. For
instance, in Republican-controlled Georgia, Governor Nathan Deal vetoed
the state’s equivalent of North Carolina’s “bathroom bill” after facing
intense pressure from mobile business interests like the National Football
League, which threatened to pass over Atlanta for future Super Bowls.145
While the discussion above provides some reason to hope that the
current polarized political environment may not be permanent, there are
unfortunately just as many reasons to fear that it will be. Unlike Georgia,

141. See MANN, supra note 23, at 130, 185 (describing drug epidemic in rural areas as
“so devastating that drug experts compare it to the urban crack explosion of the late 1980s”).
142. On the complex politics of trade and the TPP, see Appelbaum, supra note 101, and
Calmes, supra note 101.
143. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 179-86,
252-53 (noting several impacts of globalization upon cities).
144. See id. at 179-86.
145. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill
Criticized as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-governor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticizedas-anti-gay [https://perma.cc/P332-4KTA].
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North Carolina went through with its bathroom bill despite the severe
economic consequences, perhaps because legislators saw that those
consequences would largely be concentrated in the very cities that opposed
the bill. Indeed, Charlotte itself has borne the brunt of the backlash against
HB2, as several rock singers cancelled concerts scheduled in the city and,
as mentioned before, employers like PayPal and the NBA All-Star game
withdrew their plans for the city.146 Reflecting the zero-sum nature of state
politics, Republican state legislators might well have figured that HB2
would only help their standing with rural constituents if the law proved
harmful to Charlotte. Although the state did repeal some of HB2’s
provisions, it did so only because it was threatened with losing the one
thing urban and rural dwellers both care about – college basketball.147 The
bruising preemption battles between cities and states nationwide, as well as
the scorched-earth nature of the 2016 presidential campaign, reveal that
urban and rural dwellers have not only different interests, but profoundly
disparate and deeply opposed worldviews.148
On balance, while
globalization may confound partisan realignment, it does not look likely to
resolve the widening cultural, economic, and political chasm between
urban and rural residents.
III. THE FAILED PROMISE OF INTRASTATE FEDERALISM
A.

Federalism and Madisonian Democracy

If it is true that rural and urban voters now represent two permanently
warring classes, then the “Madisonian” vision of liberal democracy does
not adequately describe our republic. Instead of shifting coalitions along
multiple lines, we now have a society divided firmly into two camps along
the single line of partisanship. In place of the belief that there can be
mutual gains in politics—that today’s minority may be tomorrow’s
majority—there is now the widely shared belief that politics is zero-sum,
that one group gains only at the expense of another, and that every loss will
prove apocalyptic. Dahl warns that “[t]here are no cases in which a
democracy has managed to settle conflicts of this kind peacefully.”149
Fortunately, perhaps, the Madisonian view of liberal democracy is only
one strand in our political tradition. There is a competing strand (with
which Madison himself sometimes agreed) that frankly recognizes the
durability of group conflict in our society and tries to mitigate it
structurally. This strand is federalism. Under the federal structure of our
146. See Gordon et al., supra note 5.
147. See Jarvis, et al., supra note 6 (explaining that state repealed part of HB2 due to
concerns that NCAA would refuse to host college basketball championships there).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 144-45.
149. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 277.
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Constitution, states are considered neither arbitrary collections of
individuals nor fleeting coalitions, but permanent sovereign entities that
enjoy direct representation of their collective interests at the national level,
and autonomy over their internal affairs. While federalism today serves
many purposes,150 its original and perhaps abiding goal is to provide a
mechanism for recognizing group rights and mediating tensions between
competing groups within the framework of the nation-state.151 The framers
of our Constitution were generally less concerned with individual rights
than with the rights of states against intrusion by the national
government.152 Accordingly, our Constitution recognizes states’ group
interests in two distinct ways. First, it provides direct representation for
states in the national government, most significantly through the Senate,153
and second, it limits the scope of national power in order to maximize
states’ autonomy to act with respect to their own internal affairs.154 As
Will Kymlicka argues, this combination of group-based representation and
group self-government is a particularly effective means of ensuring group
rights within a federal structure. Group-based representation enables the
group to integrate into the wider society on its own terms, whereas group
self-government gives the group a measure of freedom from the wider
society.155
A robust federalism, then, offers a potential solution to the rural/urban
divide embodied in the preemption conundrum. As it happens, most states
do practice a version of federalism that provides representation for urban
and rural areas and limited autonomy for local government, often including
some immunity from state preemption. Ironically, however, as the
remainder of this Part shows, the unprincipled way in which federalism has
been implemented in most states has actually worsened the rural/urban
divide. The deepening preemption conflict is one manifestation of this
problem.

150. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 34-67 (2011) (reviewing
justifications for federalism).
151. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and
Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1300 (1994) (noting that federalism
provides “political autonomy” for groups).
152. See generally AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECREATION
(1999) (arguing that the Bill of Rights was more focused on protecting rights of groups like
states, militias, churches, and juries against the federal government than on individual rights
against government generally).
153. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing equal representation for states in the
Senate).
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not expressly granted the federal
government to the states).
155. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 167,
170-77 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
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B.

Intrastate Federalism

While at the time of the Constitution’s framing and for many decades
thereafter the predominant line of political cleavage was between northern
and southern states, today the major cleavage is between urban and rural
areas within states.156 The difficulty this raises is that federalism does not
exist at the intrastate level in the same way that it does at the national level.
Local governments, for example, have never been perceived as sovereign
in the way states are. It has long been established that local governments
are mere creatures of the state with no inherent power and no immunity
from interference by their “parent” state.157 Furthermore, states cannot
provide distinctive representation for groups at the state level by, for
example, giving cities or counties designated legislators because states are
required to apportion votes for the legislature in accordance with the
principle of “one person, one vote.”158 As a result, sub-state groups have
neither autonomy nor direct representation.
Nevertheless, states have attempted to circumvent this problem by
creating a quasi-federal structure in which rural and urban areas have both
direct representation and committed authority over matters affecting
themselves. States have provided some degree of direct representation by
requiring the election of legislators through geographic districts, and they
have provided a measure of committed authority by giving local
governments home rule. The following two sections describe these
complementary aspects of “intrastate federalism.” The combination of
legislative districting and local home rule does not create a true federal
structure, but has perhaps come close enough most of the time. However,
as I conclude, the political realignment and resultant preemption trend we
are witnessing today demonstrate that this quasi-federal structure is

156. See McKee, supra note 77, at 101-02 (political conflict between rural northern
Republicans and rural southern Democrats has been displaced by conflict between rural
Republicans and urban Democrats).
157. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted [sic] to
them . . . . The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers,
may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies,
expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done,
conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against
their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming
its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States.”).
158. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (reaffirming validity of one person,
one vote rule and clarifying its application); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
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insufficient to mitigate the rural/urban conflict, and may in fact be making
it worse.
1.

Legislative Districting

To begin with districting, the constitutionally mandated “one person, one
vote” rule prohibits states from providing direct representation for urban or
rural groups of voters. Prior to Baker v. Carr159 and Reynolds v. Sims,160
states routinely provided such group-based representation by apportioning
legislators so that less populous rural areas had disproportionate voting
power, in order to ensure that rural interests were not drowned out by the
emerging urban majority.161 In Reynolds, however, the Court held this
system to be unconstitutional and required that all votes be weighted
equally regardless of geography.162 In fact, one central purpose of the one
person, one vote rule was to prevent states from weighting rural interests
more heavily than urban interests.163 Though dissenters in the early one
person, one vote cases argued that “[r]epresentative government is a
process of accommodating group interests,”164 the majority responded that
the right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.”165 The Reynolds
court specifically rejected the notion that local governments were sovereign
entities that were entitled to direct representation in the state legislature.166
There is, however, still a way of providing representation for sub-state
groups that is consistent with the one person, one vote rule, and it is a
mechanism that has been adopted by every state (as well as the U.S. House
of Representatives): electing legislators from single-member geographic
districts rather than “at-large,” in which all of the state’s representatives are
chosen in a single, statewide election. Districting may not seem a
particularly effective mechanism for recognizing groups in light of the one
person, one vote rule, since the boundaries of districts are constantly

159. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
160. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
161. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 52, at 126 (state governments were not
responsive to urban needs because “districts were drawn up to ensure that rural counties
would outvote cities in the state legislative chambers,” regardless of population).
162. See 377 U.S. at 562 (“Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.”).
163. See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and
the Jewish Question, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2014).
164. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
165. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561 (1963); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Reynolds makes plain that the one
person, one vote principle safeguards the individual’s right to vote, not the interests of
political groups.”).
166. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575 (“Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or
whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities.”).
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adjusted to account for population changes (and to accommodate
legislators’ desire to gerrymander districts for partisan benefit). As a result,
the “group” represented by legislative districts is not a fixed normative or
territorial entity such as a city, but is in some sense an arbitrary grouping of
individuals.167
Nevertheless, legislative districting is at least a partial concession to
group rights because geographic proximity clearly correlates with shared
interests and political preferences to some degree.168 This point was
emphasized by the dissenters in the early one person, one vote cases: “[t]he
very fact of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the
Court does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of
legislative representation of regional needs and interests.”169 In the years
since the early cases, the correlation between geography and group interest
has only grown stronger. As Bill Bishop explains, Americans are
increasingly segregating themselves into geographic enclaves of likeminded individuals who have similar lifestyles and political affiliations,
and this self-sorting is one of the drivers of our current era of political
polarization.170
Districting enables states to recognize group rights because it gives
groups a degree of political representation that is, notwithstanding the one
person, one vote rule, disproportionate to the size of those groups’
population. In the words of one observer, “[d]istricting serves various
purposes but important among them is giving representation to interests
which would be submerged by majorities in larger groupings of voters.”171
Districting is able to circumvent the general principle of majority rule by
selectively “wasting” votes. North Carolina, for example, has given its
rural areas a huge majority in the state legislature, although rural dwellers
are at best a small majority, and possibly a minority of the state’s actual
167. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1607 (1993) (“[D]istricting under the oneperson, one-vote rule is arbitrary.”).
168. See Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the Jewish Question,
supra note 163, at 52 (territory is “a strong proxy for interest”).
169. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
170. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 22-35. Bishop’s book implicitly answers Lani
Guinier’s argument that districting only imperfectly captures interests because voters do not
consciously choose to move into electoral districts the way they move to a neighborhood or
city. See Guinier, supra note 167, at 1606. Bishop notes that although individuals do not
check voting records before moving, they do choose cultural and lifestyle attributes that are
effective proxies for the community’s political orientation. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 2223.
171. Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 277;
see also Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The very fact of geographic
districting, the constitutional validity of which the Court does not question, carries with it an
acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional needs and interests.”).
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population, by packing urban Democratic voters into districts with huge
Democratic majorities while spreading rural Republican voters more thinly
across many districts. In this instance, the legislature has wasted far more
Democratic than Republican votes – that is, many of the Democratic votes
are irrelevant to the outcome of elections because they are cast in
overwhelmingly Democratic districts, whereas Republican votes are more
efficiently distributed in places where they actually determine the result.
The state has deliberately chosen to waste more Democratic than
Republican votes in order to give disproportionate political power to rural
Republican voters.172 While the wasting of votes may appear to be a
deficiency in the districting process, Lani Guinier perceptively observes
that the whole point of districting is to determine how to distribute wasted
votes.173 In other words, all districting is essentially gerrymandering. By
choosing to waste more urban than rural votes, legislators are thereby
choosing to give rural areas a voice disproportionate to their numbers.
Although this strategy is obviously not majoritarian, it is consistent with
federalism’s goal to provide representation for distinct groups rather than
treating them as aggregations of individuals to be combined into simple
majorities.
2.

Local Government and Home Rule

If districting provides a crude form of group-based representation at the
state level, local government provides an equally crude form of the second
feature of federalism: group autonomy. This is done somewhat differently
from districting. Unlike districts, local governments can be created and
modified without regard to the one person, one vote rule. In most states,
local governments may be formed by any group of people who desire to
incorporate a municipality, and neighboring areas that object to the
incorporation generally have no right to a say in the matter notwithstanding
the one person, one vote rule.174 Courts frequently recognize that the one

172. See Guinier, supra note 167, at 1615; Kardish, supra note 35.
173. See Guinier, supra note 167, at 1615 (districting “in essence is the process of
distributing wasted votes”).
174. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (1990) (observing that many states allow groups as small
as seventy-five people to incorporate, and the main criterion is simply whether the people
desire to incorporate); see also Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838
P.2d 1198, 1206 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the state could constitutionally restrict vote on
incorporation of new city to the voters residing within the territory to be incorporated
notwithstanding one person/one vote rule and concluding that “the essence of this case is not
the fundamental right to vote, but the state’s plenary power to set the conditions under
which its political subdivisions are created”); cf. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty.
Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S. 259, 269 (1977) (holding that one person/one vote rule
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person, one vote rule is inappropriate in the context of municipal boundary
change because the residents of different communities constitute distinct
groups with divergent interests.175 As a result, the boundaries of local
governments are rarely the same as the boundaries of legislative districts,
and so the “group” represented at the state level by a legislator is not the
same group exercising autonomy at the local level.
Once in existence, local governments often enjoy home rule, which
allows them to enact a wide range of legislation without specific state
authorization, and even immunity against state preemption.176 The original
model of home rule, known as “imperio” home rule because it was
designed to create an “imperium in imperio,” or “a state within a state,”
attempted to introduce a federal structure into state/local relations akin to
the relationship between the federal and state government, so that local
governments would have constitutionally committed authority over certain
“local” affairs.177 As noted earlier, one of home rule’s specific purposes
was to reduce state interference in local matters and to give local
governments a degree of autonomy.178 Courts typically defer widely to
local enactments, particularly on matters relating to land use or school
control, on the grounds that such decisions embody the collective will of
the community.179
In tandem, districting and home rule can be very effective means of
recognizing group rights and mitigating conflicts between groups.180 Home

is inapplicable to state structuring of local governments because states have “wide
discretion . . . in forming and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions”).
175. See Lockport, 430 U.S. at 268-72 (holding that the state of New York could
constitutionally weigh votes of city and non-city voters in a referendum on county
restructuring differently because city and non-city voters have “distinctive interests” in
restructuring); Bd. of Supervisors, 838 P.2d at 1200 (“[C]ommunity residents and
landowners often prefer to govern their local affairs insofar as possible, and cityhood
provides them with greater opportunities for self-determination than does residence or
ownership in a more amorphous unincorporated area.”).
176. On home rule, see, for example, Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 (2009), and
Barron, supra note 55, at 2347.
177. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 203-05
(noting parallels between early “imperio” model of home rule and national/state relationship
under Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
179. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 939, 947-49; 997-99 (2013) (discussing judicial deference to local land use
decisions with spillover impacts); Kenneth A. Stahl, Reliance in Land Use Law, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 949, 982-87, 1016-17 (2013).
180. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism–Voting Rights as an American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 84 (1995) (describing Voting Rights Act as recognizing
“geographic and political separation” between groups); Guinier, supra note 167, at 1627
(arguing that race-conscious districting becomes necessary when racial divisions are
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rule allows each group to create policies tailored to its specific needs
without affecting neighboring communities who may have different needs
or demands. To the extent communities see themselves as distinct moral
cultures within the state, they can craft local rules that reflect their
distinctive cultures and avoid conflicts between competing cultures that
could arise if there were a uniform statewide standard.181 If home rule thus
segregates competing groups into semi-autonomous enclaves, legislative
districting is a means of integrating those groups into a shared political
culture.182 As Pamela Karlan explains, the size and group dynamics of a
legislature facilitate the bridging of differences between cultures more
easily than would be possible among the electorate as a whole.183 In
sociological terms, home rule provides “bonding” social capital within
communities, and districting provides “bridging” social capital between
communities.184
C.

Intrastate Federalism’s Failure

In principle, intrastate federalism works beautifully. In practice, it does
not work at all. Republican legislatures in states like North Carolina have
drawn districts not simply to give rural areas a voice for their distinctive
interests but to give them an insuperable advantage over growing urban
areas. Far from mediating conflicts between competing groups, this
arrangement only deepens such conflicts. Furthermore, the current rash of
preemption demonstrates that local governments rarely have any
meaningful autonomy against the state either. Through preemption,
legislators can overturn local laws enacted by urban majorities to reflect
urban values, and replace them with statewide laws reflecting rural values,
even though rural voters are at best a small majority, and possibly a

permanent, and winner-take-all majoritarianism consistently prevents minority voters from
being part of winning coalition).
181. Cf. Richard Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 183-84 (2003) (arguing that granting cities a sphere of
“constitutional home rule” in matter of same-sex marriage can give local majorities the
discretion to adopt more inclusive rules than are mandated at the statewide level without
requiring courts to mandate a uniform rule regarding marriage, thus showing “respect [for]
the significant differences of opinion regarding same-sex marriage by allowing such
opinions to be expressed at the level of community most appropriate [for] their assertion”).
182. See Karlan, supra note 180, at 96-97; Kymlicka, supra note 155, at 169-75
(explaining that providing group representation in a legislative body is a mechanism for
integrating groups into the larger political order, not segregating them).
183. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 215-19
(1989) (explaining how dynamics of legislatures enable coalition-building among legislators
much more easily than among the citizenry as a whole).
184. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 362, 400 (2000) (discussing “bridging” and “bonding” social capital).
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minority, of the statewide electorate in many states. Where there is no
room for local variation and every battle must be fought at the statewide
level, it ensures a zero-sum battle in which one side will emerge as the
winner and the other as the loser. On the whole, states like North Carolina
have structured their state politics not to mediate between urban and rural
interests but to resist the demographic tide of urbanization altogether.185
The root of the problem is that intrastate federalism is not a true federal
system, in which subgroups have constitutionally committed power, but a
unitary system in which state legislatures have ample room to decide how
much authority to confer upon substate groups.186 Courts have been
reluctant to permit a meaningful exercise of federalism at the intrastate
level because of an abiding suspicion of the very idea of group rights, a
suspicion rooted in the tradition of Madisonian liberalism that fears
“factions” and prefers that society be ordered around the individual rather
than groups.187
To begin with home rule, courts have long resisted seeing local
governments as deserving of autonomy, and have never treated home rule
as providing any real federalism. Though the original “imperio” home rule
model was supposed to transform the relationship between states and local
governments into a true federal relationship in which local governments
had relative autonomy over local affairs, in practice home rule has rarely
worked this way because the dividing line between local and state affairs is
extremely amorphous. On almost every subject of government regulation,
from land use to health care, from the conditions of employment to civil
rights, there are equally persuasive arguments that the matter requires
statewide uniformity and that the matter calls for local experimentation and
the application of local knowledge.188 As a result, in situations where there
is a conflict between states and local governments, courts are reluctant to
compromise states’ police powers and undermine statewide uniformity in

185. See Ehrenhalt, supra note 8 (arguing that wave of preemption in North Carolina
represents effort by rural-controlled legislature to restore state’s rural past in the face of
rapid urbanization).
186. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 200-01
(contrasting “federal” system against “unitary” system).
187. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 65, at 1088 (describing liberal tradition’s mistrust of
groups intermediate between the state and the individual, particularly local governments:
“[t]he evolution of liberalism thus can be understood as an undermining of the vitality of all
groups that had held an intermediate position between what we now think of as the sphere of
the individual and that of the state”).
188. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 232
(“Any argument in favor of statewide uniformity can be met with an equally forceful
argument on behalf of local diversity, and vice versa.”).
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the interest of local self-government.189 Moreover, many states have
adopted a form of home rule that gives local governments no immunity
against state interference, and a handful of others, like North Carolina, do
not offer their local governments home rule at all.190 States without home
rule are subject to “Dillon’s Rule;” local governments are completely
subservient to the state and have only those powers specifically delegated
to them by the state.191 Thus, in most states, including and perhaps
especially in North Carolina, local governments have little power to block
explicit state preemption whether they have home rule or not.192
With regard to districting, courts have tolerated the practice, even when
used to gerrymander districts for partisan advantage, because they do not
see districts as groups at all, but only as arbitrary collections of individuals
who freely shift their allegiances in true Madisonian fashion. In Davis v.
Bandemer, for example, the Court addressed the question of whether
gerrymandering a legislative district for partisan advantage could violate
the equal protection clause.193 The dissent would have found an equal
protection violation, arguing that “[t]he concept of representation
necessarily applies to groups,” and therefore that members of the losing
party in a gerrymandered district suffer harm as a group because they can
expect to have less influence with their representative than members of the
winning party.194 However, a plurality of the Court answered that even if
the minority party “loses election after election,”195 its members would

189. See Barron, supra note 55, at 2347-48 (noting that courts may be reluctant to
broadly construe local governments’ home rule powers because of “a more general judicial
uneasiness with creative local action and a corresponding preference for uniformity”).
190. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 176, app. at 1374-1424 (listing home rule status
for all fifty states); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124-27
(2007) (discussing different models of home rule).
191. See, e.g., DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK
10-11 (2001); Barron, supra note 55, at 2285-88; Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal
Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1206-11 (2008).
192. Some scholars have persuasively argued that where local governments act to protect
certain constitutional liberties that are incapable of direct judicial enforcement, states may
be prohibited from preempting them. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City:
Traces of Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Schragger, supra note 181, at
172. Arguably, Charlotte’s “bathroom bill” could fall within the sphere of “constitutional
home rule,” as it may be an effort by the city to enforce the guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment to provide equal protection of the law to transgender individuals. However,
even if constitutional home rule were explicitly recognized by the courts–which it never has
been–it would not provide immunity against the vast majority of preemption laws, such as
those dealing with the minimum wage, fracking, plastic bag bans, nutrition, and the like,
which do not appear to involve local protections of any constitutional freedoms.
193. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
194. See id. at 167, 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 132.
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have no equal protection claim because the Court generally indulges the
assumption that the winning candidate adequately represents everyone in
the district, including those who voted for the losing candidate.196 In an
often-quoted line, the Court stated that “the power to influence the political
process is not limited to winning elections.”197 In a subsequent case, Vieth
v. Jubelirer, a plurality of the Court went even further, finding partisan
gerrymandering to be a non-justiciable “political question” in part because
“[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from
one election to the next; and even within a given election, not all voters
follow the party line.”198 By contrast, in recent years the Court has become
especially vigilant in preventing districts from being constructed in such a
way as to explicitly take account of “immutable” group characteristics like
race.199
In summary, neither districting nor home rule provide meaningful
recognition for group rights. As a result, state legislatures are free to ignore
or override group claims, and worse, to manipulate intrastate federalism to
favor certain groups and disfavor others.

196. A plurality of the Court has subsequently opined that partisan gerrymandering is a
nonjusticiable political question; thus, it is not even theoretically possible to attack partisan
gerrymandering as an equal protection violation. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267
(2004).
197. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
198. See 541 U.S. 267, 287-88 (holding that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable
political question and does not violate equal protection clause because the clause
“guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government
to equivalently sized groups”).
199. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that the legislature violates the
equal protection clause where race is the “dominant and controlling rationale” for creating
electoral districts); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that where district’s shape
can only be explained by reference to race, it violates equal protection clause); cf. Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905-06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the
“assumption that racial groups can be conceived of largely as political interest groups” as
“repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution”). The recent
fate of North Carolina’s egregious gerrymander is a remarkable demonstration of the current
state of judicial doctrine regarding gerrymandering. A panel of three federal judges
invalidated the state’s Senate districting map, not on the grounds that it was impermissible
partisan gerrymandering, but that it was invalid racial gerrymandering. The court reached
this conclusion because the state had attempted to disguise its partisan gerrymander as an
effort to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by creating safe majority-minority
districts. See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016). The problem,
in other words, was not that the state had given too little attention to the rights of minority
groups but that it had given too much. In the future, states like North Carolina will
presumably be more forthright in declaring that partisan gerrymandering is their motivation.
The Covington case may come before the Supreme Court this term.
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Reviving Intrastate Federalism

The courts’ reluctance to recognize a robust intrastate federalism stems
from a suspicion of the idea of group rights and a corresponding preference
for individual rights. In Vieth and Davis, for example, the Supreme Court
assumes that districts—unless racially gerrymandered—are agglomerations
of abstract individuals, that partisan affiliations are fleeting, and that
political contests are endlessly malleable rather than fixed and zero-sum.200
As this Article has shown, however, these assumptions no longer hold, if
they ever did. It now appears that urban Democrats and rural Republicans
have become permanent and fixed antagonists, not temporary coalitions,
and the number of truly persuadable independent voters is declining.201
Considering that partisans in both camps no longer wish to even socialize
with each other, it is not plausible to suppose that voters will be convinced
to change their beliefs or loyalties. The fact that party leaders on both sides
have given up the effort to convince voters, and now focus instead on
motivating their own partisans and suppressing votes from the competing
party, is strong evidence of that point.202 When courts proceed on the
assumption that Madisonian democracy is still operative, despite increasing
evidence that society is composed of competing groups, it leads precisely
to the political crisis point we have now reached, in which a dominant
group uses the structure of democratic institutions to preserve its
dominance. In this case, that institution is federalism. Though intended as
a tool for mediating group conflict, federalism has ironically become yet
another front within that conflict.
It follows logically that federalism can only work if it is enshrined in the
state constitution, and thereby immunized from partisan manipulation.
Most states placed home rule provisions in their constitutions, committing
certain functions to state and local authorities respectively, for exactly this
reason.203 But the failure of home rule to actually provide meaningful
intrastate federalism should give us some pause before settling on this
solution. Imperio home rule failed because there is no rational way to
discern which matters ought to be handled locally and which by the
state.204 In the absence of a principled dividing line between state and local
functions, judges have tended to import their own ideological views about
the relative merits of centralized or decentralized powers into the resolution

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Vieth, 541 U.S. 267; Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-29.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
See KRANE, supra note 191, at 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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of this question, and they have generally favored centralization.205
Ultimately, how much power is desirable for localities to exercise vis-à-vis
the state and when to prefer uniformity over diversity or vice versa is in the
nature of a political question that is more suitably resolved in the political
forum than the judicial one.206
Of course, this conclusion takes us right back to the initial problem,
which is that the political forum is itself so fractured into competing groups
that it seems impossible to settle on any kind of policy decision about the
appropriate place of local governments within the state that will not be
perceived by one side or the other as a cynical power grab by a transitory
majority. This is so because, while courts have erred in treating home rule
as a justiciable question, they have made exactly the opposite mistake in
the partisan gerrymandering cases, ruling such claims to be non-justiciable
political questions. A persuasive and well-developed theory of judicial
review holds that courts should most aggressively intervene in the political
process when there is a failure in the political process that the process itself
is incapable of correcting. In a much-quoted passage from his classic book
Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely explains that such a process failure
occurs where:
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually
denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority
are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby

205. See Barron, supra note 55, at 2347 (noting that courts may be reluctant to broadly
construe local governments’ home rule powers because of “a more general judicial
uneasiness with creative local actions and a corresponding preference for uniformity”);
Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 231-35 (providing
example of courts importing ideological views into home rule dispute).
206. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 232
(arguing that home rule could be considered a nonjusticiable political question). In a recent
article, Paul Diller argues that state preemption of urban laws is inconsistent with
democratic norms because urban areas are underrepresented relative to rural areas at the
state and federal level as a result of intentional and unintentional gerrymandering and other
factors. See Paul Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule: Part II–The Promise and Peril of
‘Constitutional Home Rule,’ 77 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author); see also
Diller, supra note 190. He argues that courts should recognize a sphere of “constitutional
home rule” for cities above a certain size and density that would immunize them against
some state acts of preemption, as a corrective against this underrepresentation. See Diller,
Re-Orienting Home Rule, supra, at 4, 26-34. Diller is persuasive on many points, and his
careful analysis is very rewarding. However, I am skeptical of the argument for
constitutional home rule because, as stated in the text, courts have had a very unsuccessful
track record at distinguishing “local” from “statewide” matters. See Stahl, Local Home Rule
in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50. Furthermore, as explained below, the courts
would go a long way toward correcting the urban disadvantage if they were more assertive
in policing partisan gerrymandering. See infra text accompanying notes 202-12.
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denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system.207

Partisan gerrymandering in states like North Carolina represents exactly
the sort of process failure Ely describes. Gerrymandering closes the
“channels of political change” by enabling the very representatives who are
elected as a result of it to perpetuate it, thereby ensuring that the rural “ins”
stay in and the urban “outs” stay out. 208 This process failure would
perhaps be little cause for concern if, as the Court often assumes, districts
were simply agglomerations of abstract individuals with fleeting
allegiances. In an era when rural and urban dwellers have sorted
themselves into competing political camps, however, partisan
gerrymandering threatens to permanently shut the emerging majority of
urban voters out of power.
The process failure created by partisan gerrymandering in turn affects
the way we think about home rule. Because partisan gerrymandering
assures rural Republican control of the statehouse in many places, urban
Democrats can only wrest such control by relocating power elsewhere, and
so home rule becomes a kind of code word for partisan politics. To
strengthen home rule, in other words, would be to empower Democratic
cities vis-à-vis Republican legislatures; to weaken it would be to do the
opposite. In light of the obvious political implications of home rule, it is
unlikely that voters and legislators will see the question of local power as
anything but a partisan issue.209
To break the Gordian knot and enable the allocation of power between
states and local governments to be evaluated on its merits would require the
Court to reconsider the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering. Several
gerrymandering cases are indeed pending before the Court at the time of

207. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980).
208. Id.; see also Symposium, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005) (describing how process-policing arguments set
forth in Ely’s work could apply to gerrymandering).
209. The obvious political implications of home rule in light of partisan gerrymandering
make me skeptical of Professor Diller’s proposal to create a sphere of constitutional home
rule to counteract the urban disadvantage at the state level. See supra note 206.
Intentionally or not, Diller’s proposal may be read as a tool for empowering Democrats
against Republicans. On the other hand, attacking partisan gerrymandering directly would
not have a similar implication, as a prohibition or limit on partisan gerrymandering would
apply to all parties. The root of the disagreement between Diller and myself may be that he
sees unintentional gerrymandering as a more significant factor than intentional
gerrymandering in creating the urban disadvantage, whereas I believe the opposite. See
Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule, supra note 206, at 50 (“[E]ven neutral redistricting might
not entirely eliminate the urban disadvantage in first-past-the-post elections so long as
compact, contiguous districts are used.”). The empirical evidence on the impact of
intentional versus unintentional gerrymandering is admittedly mixed. See supra note 28.
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this writing.210 However, the Court has been reluctant to enter this
“political thicket,” a reluctance driven largely by its worry that it cannot
formulate a judicially administrable standard to judge the practice.211
Perhaps the Court will change its view if it becomes convinced that
partisan divisions today represent a society irreparably fractured into
competing groups.212
CONCLUSION
Insofar as federalism is intended to accommodate competing groups
within the nation-state, it is an alternative to a far more drastic solution to
competing group claims—secession.213 During the early twentieth century,
a period much like our own during which globalization and an influx of
immigrants transformed cities and drove a wedge between rural and urban
voters, urban reformers argued that cities had so outpaced their states and
become so different from other areas in the state that they should secede.214
This did not happen, of course, because our political tradition makes
secession extremely difficult. As creatures of their parent state, local
governments cannot secede without permission from the state, and though
in principle state constitutions sometimes permit areas of a city to secede

210. The Court recently decided one gerrymandering case on technical grounds, see
Bethune-Hill et al. v. Virginia State Bd. Of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). For another
case heard the same day that is still pending, see McCrory v. Harris, No. 15-1262 (North
Carolina). See Whitford et al. v. Gill, No. 3:15 cv-00421 (Wisconsin) and Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-691 (Alabama), for other
gerrymandering cases likely to be heard by the Court in 2017.
211. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287-88 (2004).
212. The Whitford case will be particularly interesting to watch because it provides a
clear standard for judging extreme partisan gerrymandering that may satisfy the Court’s
desire for a judicially manageable standard. The three-judge panel in Whitford determined
that Wisconsin’s state assembly district map represented an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander using a standard developed by several election law scholars called the
“efficiency gap.” The efficiency gap refers to the difference in the number of wasted votes
across party lines. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015). The Whitford court
found that the efficiency gap between wasted Republican and Democratic votes was
sufficiently large to make the gerrymander unconstitutional. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15CV-421-BBC, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wisc. Nov. 21, 2016)
213. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 65758, 664-65 (1991) (explaining that federalism can substitute for secession by providing
voice for subunits within a federal structure). See generally Erin Ryan, Secession and
Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist
Society (May 4, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775377 [https://
perma.cc/LHM3-E5NW] (arguing that federalism is a substitute for secession).
214. See Robert C. Brooks, Metropolitan Free Cities, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 222, 230-31 (1915)
(arguing that secession is necessary to “separate[] unlike social units and permit[] each to
develop freely in its own way”).
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from the city, the barriers to secession are usually so high that it very rarely
occurs in practice.215
In place of secession, cities were offered home rule. Federalism was to
be a substitute for secession. As we have seen, though, home rule today
offers cities little protection from exploitation by the state. In the absence
of strong home rule, the question must be asked: why shouldn’t cities
secede? Urban and rural areas are so radically divided that a single
citizenship seems at least unreasonably optimistic. As Cass Sunstein
argues, secession may be justified where a subunit has reason to believe
that it will be more economically successful on its own; where it is the
victim of consistent exploitation by the state; and where it has a distinct
cultural identity.216 All of these justifications apply to urban areas today.
Justified or not, the hurdles to secession are high, and rightly so.
Secession, as Richard Briffault writes, “is a reflection of profound
pessimism about the capacity of a polity to handle serious internal
differences democratically and to govern all residents fairly.”217 One of the
signature characteristics of today’s nation-states is that they accommodate
within their borders a wide variety of interests and cultures. The very
concept of nationality is an “imagined community” of people who are in
reality radically different but imagine themselves to be part of a single,
transcendent union.218 This fiction of nationality is a precarious one,
however, sustained by a very thin tissue of shared history and values.
Many scholars argue that globalization undermines the very idea of
nationality, for it creates both supranational and subnational allegiances
that are far stronger than any attachment to the arbitrary construction of the
nation-state.219 If every group that felt its ties to the nation-state
attenuating were able to secede, the state would soon collapse.
What has been said so far leaves us with three possible resolutions to the
political impasse preemption epitomizes. The first is the introduction into
our state constitutions of a true federal system on the model of our national
Constitution. For the reasons above this appears unlikely, and may be
215. For the most famous case of an attempted secession that failed to clear the numerous
legal hurdles, see Briffault, supra note 53 (regarding Staten Island’s effort to secede from
New York City in the early 1990s).
216. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 659-61, 664-66.
217. See Briffault, supra note 53, at 846.
218. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983) (describing the
nation as an “imagined community” whose members have little organic connection to each
other but imagine themselves as part of a single community thanks to novels and print
media creating a sense of shared identity).
219. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized (The State of Citizenship
Symposium), 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 505 (2000) (“[P]eople locate their
fundamental identities in, and solidarities with, a variety of communities that are neither
defined nor circumscribed by nation-state boundaries.”).

2017]PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM & LOCAL DEMOCRACY 179
unwise.220 Courts are ill-suited to determine what matters are properly
considered “local” and what “statewide.” The best the courts can do is to
clear the channels of political change so that the citizenry can make a
reasoned judgment about the preferred allocation of power between states
and local governments. This outcome may alleviate the immediate
preemption problem, but it will not resolve the larger rural/urban political
divide that currently plagues our politics. The second possibility, then, is
the further deterioration of the idea of the nation-state, which many
scholars believe is already underway in this age of globalization.221 Our
political tradition suggests, however, that while the nation-state may
become wobbly, our attachment to the status quo and the considerable
amount of violence that has gone into establishing our current territorial
boundaries means we are probably stuck with the nation-state for a while
longer. That leaves the third possibility, which is that as the battle between
urban and rural areas intensifies, we will answer by strengthening the myth
of imagined community, and hoping that myth is sufficient to overcome
our differences.

220. See supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
221. See generally YALE H. FERGUSON & RICHARD W. MANSBACH, GLOBALIZATION: THE
RETURN OF BORDERS TO A BORDERLESS WORLD? 75-78 (2012); Mauro F. Guillen, Is
Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the
Social Science Literature, in READINGS IN GLOBALIZATION: KEY CONCEPTS AND MAJOR
DEBATES 4, 11-13 (George Ritzer & Zeynep Atalay eds., 2010); Susan Strange, The
Westfailure System, in READINGS IN GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 220.

